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Recent Decisions
CREDITORS' RIGHTS-DuE PROCESS-No NOTICE OR OPPOR-
TUNITY To BE HEARD NECESSARY FOR ISSUANCE OF WRITS OF SEQUES-
TRATION WHEN OTHER PROCEDURAL SAFEGUARDS ARE PRES-
ENT-Mitchell v. W T. Grant Company.'
In February of 1972, W.T. Grant filed suit in Orleans Parish,
Louisiana against Mitchell for the balance due under an install-
ment sales contract and moved for the issuance of a writ of se-
questration.2 Without any notice or opportunity for Mitchell to be
heard, a judge reviewed the request 3 and ordered the writ's issu-
ance. One month later, Mitchell moved to dissolve the writ of
sequestration on the ground that the seizure was in violation of
the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment.5 Mitchell
argued that the statute authorizing sequestration was both void
on its face and as applied to him. Since he had possession and a
substantial interest in the goods, Mitchell contended that due
process requires a prior hearing. This contention was rejected by
the trial and appellate courts as well as the Supreme Court of
Louisiana.' The United States Supreme Court,7 affirming the
decision below, viewed the Louisiana procedure as "a
constitutional accommodation of the respective interests of buyer
and seller."' The procedure, as administered in Orleans Parish,9
does not violate due process because of the following safeguards:
1. 416 U.S. 600 (1974); For a recent discussion of Mitchell, see North Georgia Finish-
ing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc., 43 U.S.L.W. 4192 (U.S.-Jan. 22, 1975).
2. A writ of sequestration is
A mandate of the court, ordering the sheriff in certain cases, to take in his posses-
sion, and to keep, a thing of which another person has the possession, until after
the decision of a suit, in order that it be delivered to him who shall be adjudged
entitled to have the property or possession of that thing.
BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 1531 (rev. 4th ed. 1968).
3. The request for sequestration was accompanied by the sworn affidavit of W.T.
Grant's credit manager that the allegations in the complaint were true and an allegation
that there was reason to believe that Mitchell would dispose of the property. In addition,
W.T. Grant was required to post a bond approximately double the amount alleged to be
due. 416 U.S. at 602.
4. Id. The citation to Mitchell recited the writ of sequestration, the affidavits, the
order and the bond.
5. Id. The motion was heard eleven days later and was denied.
6. W.T. Grant v. Mitchell, 263 La. 627, 269 So.2d 186 (1972).
7. 416 U.S. 600.
8. Id. at 610.
9. Under Louisiana procedure, the clerk or deputy clerks of the Civil District Courts
in any Parish, except Orleans, have been empowered to issue writs of sequestration. LA.
CODE CIV. PRO., arts. 281, 283(2) (1960).
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(a) the writ of sequestration would be issued only if the creditor
claims ownership or right to possession and alleges that the defen-
dant might conceal, dispose of, or waste the property;' (b) the
writ would be issued only if the grounds were clearly established
from the specific facts in the petition and affidavits accompany-
ing the motion;"I (c) only a judge, but not a clerk, has the author-
ity to review the motion and issue the writ; 2 (d) the debtor can
move immediately to dissolve the writ, and the burden of proof
is on the creditor to establish the grounds for its issuance;'3 (e)
the debtor, with or without moving to quash the sequestration,
may file his own bond to regain possession.'4
In deciding that the Louisiana procedure is constitutional,
the Supreme Court rejected Mitchell's "broad assertion that...
Due Process . . . guaranteed to him the use and possession of the
goods until all issues in the case were judicially resolved after full
adversary proceedings had been completed."' 5 The sole issue in
the case, therefore, was whether due process requires a prior hear-
ing in an action against a debtor in default for possession of goods.
In answering this question in the negative, the Court evaluated
the competing property interests, as defined by Louisiana law, 6
of both the creditor and the debtor. By removing the property
from the possession of the debtor, the creditor's interest is pre-
served so that a favorable judgment will be enforceable. 7 At the
10. LA. CODE CIv. PRO., art. 3571 (1960) (grounds for sequestration).
11. LA. CODE CIv. PRO., art. 3501 (1960).
12. See note 9, supra.
13. LA. CODE CIV. PRO., art. 3506 (1960).
14. LA. CODE Ctv. PRO., art. 3507 (1960).
15. 416 U.S. at 607.
16. "The reality is that both seller and buyerhad current real interests in the
property, and the definition of property rights is a matter of state law." Id. at 1898.
Louisiana is a "lien theory" state, for the creditor has a vendor's lien, and the debtor's
title and possessory right are subject to defeasance should default occur. LA. CODE Civ.
PRO., art. 2373 (1960).
It should be noted that Louisiana is the only state which has not enacted the Uniform
Commercial Code. Perhaps Justice White is attempting to insure that the holding in
Mitchell will not be limited to Louisiana, for while Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial
Code accepts neither the so-called "lien theory" or "title theory" concerning secured
transactions, the Code is equally applicable to either theory. See, U.C.C. §9-101, Official
Comment.
17. Under Louisiana law, the creditor's vendor's lien is terminated if the debtor
transfers possession. Hence, warning the debtor prior to sequestration increases the danger
of concealment, transfer or waste. W.T. Grant v. Mitchell, 263 La. 627, 269 So.2d 186
(1972). This rule is peculiar to Louisiana and may well provide a distinction between
Louisiana and Uniform Commercial Code states, for under the U.C.C. §9-307, a secured
party's interest in consumer goods is not normally terminated if the debtor transfers
possession so long as the secured party has filed a financing statement. However, under
U.C.C. §9-307(2), a security interest is terminated if the buyer is himself a consumer who
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same time, since the property is retained by the court during the
pendancy of the suit, the status quo is preserved. 8 Furthermore,
sequestration "forestall[s] violent self-help and retaliation."' 9
The Louisiana procedure does not simply protect the interest
of the creditor; the debtor's interest is also protected. To insure
that approval of the writ is not merely a ministerial act, a judge
oversees the entire procedure.'" Secondly, the property is retained
by the court pending final judgment. Third, to protect against
wrongful sequestration, the debtor is entitled to a full hearing
immediately following execution of the writ, at which the creditor
has the burden of proof.22 The creditor must demonstrate that the
grounds for the writ were present at the time of issuance; mere
proof that the grounds now exist and that he will ultimately win
cannot validate a writ. Thus, the creditor must establish that his
petition and affidavit in support of the writ presented a prima
facie case in his favor. 23
In upholding the constitutionality of Louisiana's ex parte
procedure, the Mitchell Court appears, at first glance, to reverse
has no knowledge of the security interest, he has paid "value" and no filing has occurred.
Thus, under the U.C.C., a situation analogous to the Louisiana rule may well occur. See,
COMMENT, Fuentes v. Shevin: Its Treatment by Louisiana Courts and Effect Upon Louis-
iana Law, 47 TULANE L. REv. 806, 816 (1973).
18. A similar objective is involved in the doctrine of lis pendens. See, e.g., Corey v.
Carback, 201 Md. 837, 94 A.2d 629 (1953). See also MD. R. P., Subtitle G. The Louisiana
sequestration procedure is also analogous to the federal temporary restraining order. FED.
R. Civ. P. 65(b); cf., Clark & Landers, Sniadach, Fuentes and Beyond: The Creditor Meets
the Constitution, 59 VA. L. REV. 355, 404 (1973). The only difference between the two
procedures is that it is necesssary to show irreparable harm in order to obtain a temporary
restraining order, FED. R. Civ. P. 65(b)(1), while all that is required for a writ of sequestra-
tion is that it is within the power of the defendant to do irreparable harm. LA. CODE Crv.
PRO., art. 3571 (1960). This difference may be crucial due to the "extraordinary situation"
exception of Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972). See notes 46, 47, 48, 49, infra and
accompanying text.
19. 416 U.S. at 605. It is now common knowledge that self-help, available under the
U.C.C. § 9-503, has become increasingly prevalent due to Fuentes. There can be little
doubt that this state of affairs bothers the Court, for the majority opinion notes that to
invalidate the Louisiana procedure might well result in increased reliance on self-help by
Louisiana creditors. 416 U.S. at 618. That self-help under the U.C.C. may violate due
process is presently being widely debated. See, e.g., Note, Self-Help Repossession; the
Constitutional Attack, the Legislative Response and the Economic Implications, 62 GEO.
L.J. 273 (1973).
20. 416 U.S. at 616, n.12.
21. It is noteworthy that the majority never mentions the distinction between se-
questration (where the property is retained by the court) and replevin (where the property
is turned over to the creditor). However, the Court must have given some weight to this
distinction in reaching the conclusion that the Louisiana procedure strikes a proper bal-
ance between the creditor's and the debtor's rights.
22. LA. CODE CIv. PROC., art. 3506 (1960).
23. This same standard is used to test the validity of search warrants. See, note 42,
infra and accompanying text.
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its earlier holding in Fuentes v. Shevin.4 Fuentes held Florida
and Pennsylvania replevin statutes violative of due process.25 It
has often been stated that fundamental to due process is the right
to notice and a hearing at a meaningful time in a meaningful
manner.16 Fuentes has been interpreted as holding that the only
meaningful time for a hearing is prior to any deprivation.27 As
24. 407 U.S. 67 (1972), reh. denied 409 U.S. 902 (1973). Prior to Fuentes, there was
a notable absence of constitutional challenges to prejudgment seizure procedures. This
absence may be explained partially by the fact that most seizures involved the poor, and
partially because the procedures had been widely employed by creditors for many years.
See, Constitutional Law-Debtor-Creditor Relations-Fuentes v. Shevin: Due Process
for Debtors, 51 N.C.L. REV. 111 (1972).
25. Both statutes provided for issuance of writs of replevin simply by an ex parte
application from anyone who claimed a right to possession and posted a security bond.
FLA. STAT. ANN. §78.01 (Supp. 1972):
Right to replevin.-Any person whose goods or chattels are wrongfully detained by
any other person or officer may have a writ of replevin to recover them and any
damages sustained by reason of the wrongful caption or detention as herein pro-
vided. Or such person may seek like relief, but with summons to defendant instead
of replevy writ in which event no bond is required and the property shall be seized
only after judgment, such judgment to be in like form as that provided when
defendant has retaken the property on a forthcoming bond.
PA. R. Civ. P. 1073. Commencement of Action:
(a) An action of replevin with bond shall be commenced by filing with the pro-
thonotary a praecipe for a writ of replevin with bond, together with
(1) the plaintiffs affidavit of the value of the property to be replevied, and
(2) the plaintiff's bond in double the value of the property, with security
approved by the prothonotary, naming the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania
as obligee, conditioned that if the plaintiff fails to maintain his right of
possession of the property, he shall pay to the party entitled thereto the value
of the property and all legal costs, fees and damages sustained by reason of
the issuance of the writ.
(b) An action of replevin without bond shall be commenced by filing with the
prothonotary
(1) a praecipe for a writ of replevin without bond or
(2) a complaint.
If the action is commenced without bond, the sheriff shall not replevy the
property but at any time before the entry of judgment the plaintiff, upon
filing the affidavit and bond prescribed by subdivision (a) of this rule, may
obtain a writ of replevin with bond, issued in the original action and have
the sheriff replevy the property.
In Florida and Pennsylvania, a clerk issued the writ of replevin without notice or oppor-
tunity to be heard. 407 U.S. at 70. The sheriff retained the goods for three days during
which time the debtor could post a counterbond to regain possession. FLA. STAT. ANN.
§78.13 (Supp. 1972); PA. R. Civ. P. 1076. Thereafter, the goods were handed over to the
applicant.
26. See, e.g., Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545 (1965).
27. This broad interpretation is the one generally accepted by courts applying
Fuentes. See, e.g., Schneider v. Margossian, 349 F. Supp. 741 (D. Mass. 1972) (three judge
panel); Gross v. Fox, 349 F. Supp. 1164 (E.D. Pa. 1972); McQueen v. Lambert, 348 F.
Supp. 1334 (M.D. Fla. 1972); Sena v. Montoya, 346 F. Supp. 5 (D.N.M. 1972); Shaffer v.
Holbrook, 346 F. Supp. 762 (S.D.W.Va. 1972) (use of justice of the peace does not justify
dispensing with prior hearing); cf., Velazco v. Minter, 481 F.2d 573 (1st Cir. 1973) (no
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Justice Powell noted in his concurring opinion in Mitchell, how-
ever, Fuentes unnecessarily adopted too broad a ruling, for it
would have been sufficient to simply declare the Florida and
Pennsylvania statutes "violative of due process because of their
arbitrary and unreasonable provisions"2 with virtually no protec-
tion afforded the debtor. In light of Mitchell, therefore, it seems
fair to read Fuentes as holding that a prior hearing would be
mandatory where few other procedural safeguards are present. By
so reading Fuentes, the majority in Mitchell was able to uphold
the Louisiana procedure without overruling Fuentes."5 In other
words, the Louisiana procedure, containing sufficient other pro-
cedural safeguards so that a prior hearing was not necessary, is
readily distinguishable from the procedures invalidated in
Fuentes.
In the first place, there is the essential difference between
sequestration and replevin. In sequestration, the seized property
is retained by the court thus preventing private gain by the credi-
tor.30 Consequently, sequestration provides protection of the
debtor's goods, but replevin does not. Secondly, the grounds for
issuance of a writ of sequestration in Louisiana are far narrower
than were those of a writ of replevin in Florida or Pennsylvania
where a bare assertion to a clerk that one was entitled to the writ
was sufficient.3 ' In Orleans Parish, Louisiana, the creditor must
establish a prima facie case before a judge, and thus has the right
to insure the safety of his goods though not necessarily the
ultimate right to gain possession. The judge oversees the entire
process and can appraise the legal sufficiency of the affidavits
and request additional testimony if needed. 3 But under the stat-
prereduction hearing required in case of old age survivorship and disability insurance
benefits because of negligible effect and availability of post reduction hearings); cf. Nor-
lander v. Shleck, 345 F. Supp. 595 (D. Minn. 1972) (no prior hearing required before
decision on civil service appointments so long as notice and opportunity to refute are later
given).
28. 416 U.S. at 623-24.
29. The line-up of the Court in the two decisions is noteworthy. Fuentes was a four
to three decision in which Justices Stewart, Douglas, Marshall and Brennan comprised
the majority with Justices White, Burger, and Blackmun dissenting. Justices Powell and
Rehnquist had not yet begun to participate. In Mitchell, the four to three alignment
remained the same; however, Justices Powell and Rehnquist, now participating, sided
with the Fuentes dissent increasing its number to five.
30. See notes 2 and 21, supra.
31. 407 U.S. at 74. See note 25, supra.
32. 416 U.S. at 616. A recent case, Roscoe v. Butler, 367 F. Supp. 574 (D. Md. 1973)
(three judge panel) held Maryland's attachment on original process statute unconstitu-
tional because a clerk rather than a "state official with sufficient authority" issued the
writ. For an analysis of Roscoe, see 34 MD. L. Rav. 441 (1974).
1974]
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utes involved in Fuentes, a clerk merely stamped the form re-
questing the writ if the forms were properly filled out.33 Finally,
in the Louisiana procedure, the debtor is entitled to an
immediate hearing in which the creditor has the burden of proof.
If the creditor is unable to sustain his burden, the writ is dis-
solved, and the debtor may immediately collect damages and
attorney's fees. 4 But in Fuentes, the Florida statute did not pro-
vide for a hearing immediately after deprivation. In order to re-
trieve his goods prior to the hearing on the merits, the creditor
had to file a counter bond." In the Pennsylvania statute, the
creditor was not even required to file any suit against the debtor.
The entire burden of retrieving the property rested on the
debtor.36 Since it is evident that the procedures in Fuentes pro-
vided little due process protection to the debtor, Fuentes was
justified in holding that a prior hearing was mandatory. The
Court in Mitchell found that a hearing before deprivation of pos-
session was not mandated by Fuentes because the Louisiana pro-
cedure provided numerous safeguards to prevent arbitrary en-
croachment. In reaching this decision, the Mitchell court viewed
the entire procedure as a "constitutional accommodation" pro-
tecting not only the debtor's rights but also the creditor's rights.
It must be noted, however, that the court in Mitchell did not dis-
pense with the requirement of a hearing altogether because the
sequestration procedure provides for a hearing to dissolve the writ
substantially contemporaneous with the deprivation.3"
To determine the impact of the Mitchell case, it is important
to note that the Court was split, reaching a five-four decision with
one justice concurring. The dissenting and concurring justices3"
felt that Mitchell, to the extent that it does not require a hearing
prior to any deprivation, overrules Fuentes. The dissent found the
safeguards provided in the Louisiana procedure that distinguish
33. Since the statutes did not require a judicial officer to pass on the issuance of
the writ, clerks tested "no more than the strength of the applicant's own belief in his
rights." Fuentes, 407 U.S. at 83.
34. LA. CODE CIv. PRO. art. 3506 (1960).
35. See note 25, supra.
36. Id.
37. 416 U.S. at 616.
38. 416 U.S. at 618.
39. Justices Stewart, Marshall, Douglas, and Brennan comprised the dissent. Jus-
tice Powell wrote a concurring opinion. Justice Brennan did not join in the writing of the
dissenting opinion, but simply stated that Fuentes required reversal of Mitchell. 416 U.S.
at 636. It is notable that Justice Powell is the only justice who agreed with the outcome
in Mitchell and stated that it overruled Fuentes. 416 U.S. at 623.
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it from the Florida and Pennsylvania statutes, insufficient to
uphold ex parte sequestration. First, the dissent found the
grounds for the writ's issuance to be no more than the creditor's
own belief in the validity of his right.40 But, as the Mitchell major-
ity points out, the Louisiana statute requires more than the credi-
tor's own conclusion. Facts and circumstances constituting a
prima facie case must appear on the face of the affidavits.4' It is
interesting to note that these same judges have upheld the consti-
tutionality of search warrants based on facts and circumstances
and yet have declared unconstitutional those that merely state
conclusions. 2 Similarly, the dissent states that the substitution
of a judge for a clerk is of no constitutional significance. 3 Again,
these are the same judges who require a judicial officer, rather
than a clerk, to sign search warrants.4 Therefore, the distinctions
that the Mitchell majority found between the Louisiana proce-
dure and that of Florida and Pennsylvania in Fuentes are not at
all insignificant. In reaching its decision that the only way due
process rights can be guaranteed is through a prior hearing, both
the dissent in Mitchell and the majority in Fuentes focused en-
tirely on the rights of the debtor while entirely ignoring those of
the creditor. 5
On the other hand, the majority in Mitchell realized that the
problem was basically one of accommodating both the creditor's
and the debtor's "real interest" in the property. Clearly, the
Louisiana procedure accomplishes this and is far preferable to
self-help which might well be the only alternative had Mitchell
reached a contrary result.
It is also essential to recognize that the Supreme Court re-
jected the lower court's theory that Louisiana sequestration is
valid under the "extraordinary situation" exception of Fuentes."
40. 416 U.S. at 632.
41. 416 U.S. at 605.
42. See, e.g., United States v. Harris, 403 U.S. 573 (1971); Whitely v. Warden, 401
U.S. 560 (1971). The Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure require a sworn affidavit before
a federal magistrate or state judge establishing probable cause. FED. R. CRIM. P. 41.
43. 416 U.S. at 632.
44. See, e.g., Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971). FED. R. CRIM. P.
41(a) requires a federal magistrate or state judge to issue a search warrant.
45. The "sex appeal" of Fuentes should be noted; the debtor had complained to her
creditor that the stove needed repair. 407 U.S. at 70, 87 n.17. On the other hand, in
Mitchell, the debtor did not take advantage of the opportunity to be heard immediately
following the sequestration. 416 U.S. at 610.
46. W. T. Grant v. Mitchell, 263 La. 627, 269 So.2d 186 (1972). But see, Anderson
& L'Enfant, Fuentes v. Shevin: Procedural Due Process and Louisiana Creditor's
Remedies, 33 LA. L. Rav. 62, 75 (1972).
19741
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
Since in Louisiana, the vendor's interest in the property is de-
feated if the vendee alienates the property to a bona fide pur-
chaser, the lower court felt "a special need for very prompt ac-
tion"47 existed and thus a prior hearing was not mandatory. The
United States Supreme Court, in the dissent's view, rejected this
theory because such an interpretation of the "extraordinary situ-
ation" dictum of Fuentes would entitle all Louisiana secured par-
ties to a writ of sequestration without any specific showing of
danger to the property." In order to fit within the Fuentes dic-
tum, the statute must be narrowly drawn to cover only cases
where evidence of immediate danger to the property exists.49
The rejection of the Fuentes "extraordinary situation" argu-
ment by the Supreme Court indicates that Mitchell is not neces-
sarily limited to Louisiana, a non-Uniform Commercial Code ju-
risdiction. Under Mitchell, the possibility that the creditor will
lose his security interest if the goods are disposed of cannot be
viewed as a Fuentes "extraordinary situation." This seemingly
precludes a secured party under the Uniform Commercial Code
from arguing that replevin without a prior hearing is permissible
under Fuentes where an unfiled security interest in consumer
goods is terminated through alienation to a bona fide purchaser.'
Since the safeguards in the Louisiana procedure are exten-
sive, the middle ground between Fuentes and Mitchell remains
unexplored by the Supreme Court.5" At the one end, Fuentes has
47. Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 91 (1972). "There are 'extraordinary situations'
that justify postponing notice and opportunity for a hearing. . . .These situations, how-
ever, must be truly unusual." 407 U.S. at 90.
48. 416 U.S. at 626 n.1, where the dissent stated that under the lower court's theory,
Fuentes "would be wholly obliterated in the State."
49. Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 93 (1972); Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp.,
395 U.S. 337, 339 (1969).
50. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-307(2). In other words, the fact that a secured
party's interest in consumer goods may be terminated does not justify replevin without
notice or a prior hearing, especially since the U.C.C. grants to the creditor the right to
any proceeds from the sale. U.C.C. § 9-306. Furthermore, a secured party under the
U.C.C. can always protect his interest by filing pursuant to U.C.C. art. 9, part 4.
51. Three cases decided after Mitchell have given a broad reading to its holding. In
Garcia v. Krausse, 43 U.S.L.W. 2120 (S.D. Tex. Sept. 24, 1974), the court held Texas'
sequestration procedure violative of due process since the safeguards present in Louisiana
were lacking in Texas. "The primary distinction is the lack of judicial administration and
supervision." 43 U.S.L.W. at 2120.
In Ruocco v. Brinker, 43 U.S.L.W. 2056 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 13, 1974) (three judge panel),
the court upheld Florida's mechanics' lien law although the law did not allow a hearing
prior to imposition of the lien. The court noted that Mitchell "overruled Fuentes to the
extent that Fuentes required a hearing prior to the deprivation of any significant property
interest without regard to the weight of the interests deprived or the length of such
deprivation." 43 U.S.L.W. at 2056.
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determined that, in the absence of any other safeguards, a prior
hearing must be held. At the other end, Mitchell has held that a
writ of sequestration can be issued ex parte if a judge determines
that a prima facie case exists in favor of the secured party, and
if the debtor can move to have the writ quashed immediately
upon its execution. Thus, the area between Fuentes and Mitchell
has yet to be determined.52 For instance, will a writ of attachment
rather than of sequestration, accompanied by the other Mitchell
safeguards, satisfy due process? Can a writ of sequestration be
issued if the creditor has no particular property interest in the
goods? '" Mitchell like Fuentes, provides no automatic test for
determining whether due process of law is fulfilled.
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW- FREEDOM OF INFORMATION
ACT-DISCLOSURE OF SERVICE ACADEMY'S HONOR AND ETHICS CODE
CASE SUMMARIES WITH IDENTIFYING INFORMATION DELETED IS PER-
MISSIBLE UNDER ACT-Rose v. Department of Air Force.'
Michael T. Rose, a student member of the New York Univer-
In Watson v. Branch, 43 U.S.L.W. 2099 (W.D. Mich. Sept. 10, 1974), state action was
found in the self-help provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code, §§9-503, 9-504 so that
due process must be provided to the debtor. The Watson court measured the two sections
of the U.C.C. against the procedural safeguards in Mitchell. Since no judicial supervision,
nor a simple process by which the creditor could be put to his proof, nor the requirement
that the creditor initiate suit are present, the debtor has not been afforded due process.
There is presently a split of authority on whether sufficient state action exists under
the U.C.C.'s self-help provisions. In those jurisdictions holding that there is insufficient
state action, Fuentes has been labeled a "sick joke" since a creditor may retrieve the goods
himself, but may not enlist the aid of the sheriff. The Supreme Court has avoided the
controversy; See Adams v. Southern California National Bank, 492 F.2d 324 (9th Cir.
1973), cert. den., 43 U.S.L.W. 3281, (Nov. 12, 1974); Nowlin v. Professional Auto Sales,
Inc., 496 F.2d 16 (8th Cir. 1974), cert. den. 43 U.S.L.W. 3281 (Nov. 12, 1974). Adams
presented the question whether sufficient state action exists under California's statutory
self-help repossession scheme so that the Mitchell safeguards are required.
52. Perhaps, however, Mitchell could be viewed as an exception to the Fuentes
requirement of notice and a prior hearing. In a sense, Mitchell puts flesh back on the
Fuentes skeleton.
53. In other words, is Mitchell limited to secured transactions? If not, perhaps
Mitchell somewhat limits Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp., 395 U.S. 337 (1969), which
involved prejudgment garnishment of wages. In Sniadach, it was held that due process
demanded a prior hearing. In Mitchell, Justice White distinguishes Sniadach on the
ground that the creditor there "had no prior interest in the property attached. 416
U.S. at 614. This distinction appears to be valid.
1. 495 F.2d 261 (2d Cir. 1974), petition for cert. filed, 43 U.S.L.W. 3266 (Nov. 5,
1974).
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sity Law Review, requested the United States Air Force Academy
to provide him with copies of case summaries of Honor and Ethics
Code adjudications kept on file at the Academy.2 The summaries
were to be used to document a proposed law review article on the
disciplinary systems at the Service Academies.' The Department
of the Air Force, an agency within the provisions of the Adminis-
trative Procedure Act,' refused to permit disclosure of the case
summaries. Rose then commenced suit against the Agency under
the Freedom of Information Act 5 to compel disclosure of the dis-
puted materials "with personal references or other identifying
information deleted."' The Agency proposed two grounds to jus-
tify withholding the documents: the "personal privacy" exemp-
tion of the FOIA and the "equitable discretion" of the court.' The
district court, although not persuaded by either of these argu-
ments, granted the Agency summary judgment, holding that the
summaries were protected from disclosure by Exemption Two
because they "related solely to the internal personnel rules and
practices of an agency."' On appeal by Rose to the Second Cir-
cuit, the Agency urged affirmance of the lower court's Exemption
Two holding and renewed its arguments that the summaries
should be withheld under either Exemption Six or general princi-
ples of equity. Regarding the interpretation of Exemption Six as
2. The summaries requested by Rose, a graduate of the Air Force Academy, are
reports of the disciplinary hearings that are held when a cadet has been accused of lying,
cheating or stealing.
3. The article was to be entitled "The Administrative Adjudicatory Systems of the
Service Academies: Constitutional Powers and Limitations." 495 F.2d at 262 n.2.
4. See 5 U.S.C. § 551 (1970). The named defendants were the Secretary of the Air
Force and the Superintendent of the Academy and members of his staff.
5. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1970) [hereinafter referred to as the FOIA]. Subsection (a)(3)
provides:
[E]ach agency, on request for identifiable records .... shall make the records
promptly available to any person. On complaint, the district court of the United
States in the district in which the complainant resides . . . has jurisdiction to
enjoin the agency from withholding agency records and to order the production of
any agency records improperly withheld from the complainant. In such a case the
court shall determine the matter de novo and the burden is on the agency to sustain
its action.
Subsection (b) specifies nine exemptions, including:
This section does not apply to matters that are-
(2) related solely to the internal personnel rules and practices of an agency; . . .
(6) personnel and medical files and similar files the disclosure of which would
constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.
6. 495 F.2d at 263.
7. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(6) (1970); see note 5 supra.
8. 495 F.2d at 263.
9. See note 5 supra. The Second Circuit noted that the Agency had not relied upon
Exemption Two before the district court. 495 F.2d at 263.
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dispositive of the case, the Second Circuit reversed the district
court's judgment and remanded with directions that the lower
court order release of the summaries if the material could be
properly redacted to.preclude identification of the involved ca-
dets."' Rose, only the third appellate decision to reach the merits
of an Exemption Six claim,II assumes importance for two reasons:
it is the first action under the exemption to find a serious invasion
of personal privacy, and the court judicially imposes a redaction
process upon the exemption.
Judge Feinberg, writing for the majority in Rose, stressed
that the resolution of any controversy involving the FOIA must
be undertaken with an understanding of the purpose of the Act.'2
Recognizing that "[a] democratic society requires an informed,
intelligent electorate, and the intelligence of the electorate varies
as the quantity and the quality of its information varies, '"'3 Con-
gress enacted the FOIA to provide every citizen with access to the
vast majority of government information.' 4 In furtherance of this
10. 495 F.2d at 268. Judge Moore filed a dissenting opinion, id. at 270.
11. Four other appellate decisions deal with Exemption Six: Robles v. EPA, 484
F.2d 843 (4th Cir. 1973); Getman v. NLRB, 450 F.2d 670 (D.C. Cir. 1971); Ackerly v. Ley,
420 F.2d 1336 (D.C. Cir. 1969); Tuchinsky v. Selective Serv. Sys., 418 F.2d 155 (7th Cir.
1969). Only Robles and Getman reach the merits. Four district court cases address the
exemption: Kreindler v. Department of Navy, 372 F. Supp. 333 (S.D.N.Y. 1974); Wine
Hobby, USA, Inc. v. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco & Firearms, 363 F. Supp. 231 (E.D. Pa.
1973); Kreindler v. Department of Navy, 363 F. Supp. 611 (S.D.N.Y. 1973); Washington
Research Project, Inc. v. HEW, 366 F. Supp. 929 (D.D.C. 1973). Wine Hobby and
Washington Research Project reach the merits of the Exemption Six claim.
12. 495 F.2d at 263.
13. H.R. REP. No. 1497, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 12 (1966) [hereinafter cited as H.R.
REP. No. 14971. The Senate Report recommended enactment stating:
A government by secrecy benefits no one.
It injures the people it seeks to serve; it injures its own integrity and operation.
It breeds mistrust, dampens the fervor of its citizens, and mocks their loyalty.
S. REP. No. 813, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 10 (1965) [hereinafter cited as S. REP. No. 813].
14. S. REP. No. 813, supra note 13, at 3; H.R. REP. No. 1497, supra note 13, at 1.
The FOIA amended Section 3 of the Administrative Procedure Act [hereinafter cited as
APAI, which, though passed as a public information statute, was so replete with loopholes
that it came to be cited as the basic statutory authority for withholding, rather than
disclosing, information. H.R. REP. No. 1497 at 4. By providing for disclosure only to
"persons properly and directly concerned" and allowing an agency to withhold informa-
tion "for good cause," the former public information section of the APA enabled an agency
to withhold virtually any administrative information it wanted to keep from public view.
S. REP. No. 813 at 5; H.R. REP. No. 1497 at 4-6. Further, the original disclosure section
contained no provision for judicial review of any agency's refusal to disclose. Thus, even
if an agency's rationale for withholding information contained "not a scintilla of validity,"
an aggrieved citizen could not compel disclosure. S. REP. No. 813 at 5. In an effort to
abolish these abuses, the FOIA rejects the "properly and directly concerned" test, stating
that records shall be made available to "any person." The Act also replaces phrases such
as "good cause found" and "in the public interest" with nine specific exemptions and
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goal, and in keeping with both the legislative intent and the sta-
tutory language, the disclosure provisions of the FOIA are to be
read liberally and the exemptions are to be construed narrowly.,'
The Second Circuit began its consideration of Exemption
Two by noting that "the scope of the exemption may be open to
considerable doubt since the Senate and House Reports diametri-
cally clash."'" In this instance, the court did not feel compelled
to determine which legislative body's explanation of Exemption
Two was correct.'7 Rather, the court ruled that neither interpreta-
tion sanctioned non-disclosure of the summaries. The Senate con-
struction, suggesting exemption of routine administrative mat-
ters," was found not to support exemption from disclosure be-
cause both "the legitimate public interest and the future effect
on cadets . . . differentiate the summaries from matters of daily-
routine. . .. "I' Additionally, the House Report, permitting
greater disclosure of internal management matters except where
knowledge of such matters might help outsiders circumvent
agency regulations or standards,'" did not shield the summaries
because their disclosure posed "no such danger to the effective
operation of the Codes at the Academy."'"
The Agency's contention that courts could exercise equitable
discretion to refuse to order disclosure of records even though
none of the FOIA's exemptions were found applicable had been
affords an aggrieved citizen a remedy by permitting judicial review of the agency decision.
See generally K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW § 3A (Supp. 1970) [hereinafter cited as
DAVISI; Davis, The Information Act: A Preliminary Analysis, 34 U. CHI. L. REV. 761
(1967); Koch, The Freedom of Information Act: Suggestions for Making Available to the
Public, 32 MD. L. Rav. 189 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Koch]; Nader, Freedom From
Information: The Act and the Agencies, 5 HARv. Civ. RIlGHTs-Civ. LIa. L. REV. 1 (1970)
(a critical assessment of the agencies' implementation, of the FOIA).
15. Vaughn v. Rosen, 484 F.2d 820, 823 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Soucie v. David, 448 F.2d
1067, 1080 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
16. 495 F.2d at 264.
17. The differences between the two reports have led to conflicting results among
the courts which have interpreted Exemption Two. Compare Hawkes v. IRS, 467 F.2d 787,
797 (6th Cir. 1972); Stokes v. Hodgson, 347 F. Supp. 1371, 1374 (D. Ga. 1972), with Cuneo
v. Laird, 338 F. Supp. 504 (D.D.C. 1972). See generally Project, Federal Administrative
Law Developments-1972, Developments Under the Freedom of Information Act-1972,
1973 DUKE L.J. 178, 187-89 [hereinafter cited as Duke Project].
18. The Senate Report explains that the exemption applies to such mundane mat-
ters as rules regarding parking facilities, lunch hours, and sick leave. S. REP. No. 813,
supra note 13, at 8.
19. 495 F.2d at 265.
20. The House Report characterizes Exemption Two as applying to "[olperating
rules, guidelines, and manuals of procedure for Government investigators or examiners"
but not to "employee relations and working conditions and routine administrative proce-
dures." H.R. REP. No. 1497, supra note 13, at 10.
21. 495 F.2d at 265.
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rejected by the district court's "holding that Congress did not
leave to the courts a general option of refusing to enforce the Act's
requirement of disclosure. ... 22 Noting that the appellate deci-
sions on the issue are divided,23 the Second Circuit declined to
endorse the lower court's broad holding but found it unnecessary
to render a definitive opinion on the Agency's contention. In-
stead, Judge Feinberg stated that it is "clear that generally the
Act constrains the broad use of judicial discretion to block disclo-
sure,"24 but also recognized that "a truly exceptional case might
require it. ' '25 Without attempting to define "a truly exceptional
case," the Second Circuit dismissed the Agency's contention,
finding that "in the context of Exemption Six the issue is not a
substantial one, since the language of the exemption requires a
court to exercise a large measure of discretion."26
The Second Circuit viewed the district court as having ruled
that Exemption Six did not bar disclosure of the summaries be-
cause the information had already been published in a limited
manner at the Academy as part of the Honor and Ethics Code
adjudication process.27 The lower court had, therefore, reasoned
22. Id. at 269. The FOIA is susceptible to varying interpretations. It does not man-
date judicial enforcement, but states that a "district court ... has jurisdiction to enjoin
the agency from withholding agency records .. " 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(3) (1970). Yet, the
statute also provides that: "[tihis section [the FOIA] does not authorize withholding
of information or limit the availability of records to the public, except as specificially
stated in this section .. " 5 U.S.C. § 552(c) (1970). Professor Davis contends that,
despite subsection (c), the courts have the discretionary power to refuse to order enforce-
ment. Stressing that courts have much to contribute to the difficult process of producing
workable and sensible legislation, he determines that the "specifically stated" clause
allows the courts to narrow the ascertainable meaning of the words of an exemption, but
restricts their authority to broaden that meaning. He, therefore, recommends that the
clause be repealed. See DAvis §§ 3A.6, 3A.15, 3A.32.
The legislative history is conflicting. The House Report provides that a court has the
authority to enjoin withholding "whenever it considers such action equitable and appro-
priate." H.R. REP. No. 1497, supra note 13, at 9. In contrast, the Senate Report decrees
"a general philosophy of full agency disclosure unless information is exempted under
clearly delineated statutory language." S. REP. No. 813 at 3.
The courts are divided on the question of equitable discretion. E.g., compare GSA v.
Benson, 415 F.2d 878, 880 (9th Cir. 1969) ("[Tlhe court must weigh the effects of disclo-
sure and non-disclosure, according to traditional equity principles . ). "), with Tennes-
sean Newspaper, Inc. v. FHA, 464 F.2d 657, 661 (6th Cir. 1972) (The FOIA "conveys no
discretionary power to vary the standards established in the law itself."); see also Duke
Pr'oject, supra note 17, at 178-79 n.9; Note, The Freedom of Information Act: Shredding
the Paper Curtain, 47 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 694, 708-10 (1973) [hereinafter cited as
Shredding the Paper Curtain].




27. Id. at 267. For the protection of the individuals concerned, information concern-
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that a subsequent disclosure of the summaries would not consti-
tute an "invasion" of privacy. The court of appeals, however,
characterized that approach as "ignor[ing] certain practical
realities"25 because "a person's privacy may be as effectively in-
fringed by reviving dormant memories as by imparting new infor-
mation.""9 Judge Feinberg further determined that disclosure of
even anonymous summaries could threaten the privacy of the
concerned cadets because "[d]espite the continuing injunction
of secrecy, no one can guarantee that all those who are 'in the
know' will hold their tongues, particularly years later when time
may have eroded the fabric of cadet loyalty." 0 Accordingly, the
Second Circuit held that disclosure of the summaries might con-
stitute an invasion of privacy and that the Agency's internal dis-
semination of the summaries did not lessen the concerned cadets'
right of privacy as embodied in Exemption Six.'
The finding of an invasion of privacy required the court then
to consider the second element of an Exemption Six inquiry:
would the invasion of the cadets' privacy occasioned by release
of anonymous summaries be "clearly unwarranted?" In the Sec-
ond Circuit's opinion, identification of the disciplined cadets
might have harsh consequences. The formerly accused men could
be subjected to lifelong embarrassment, disgrace, and even loss
of employment or friends.2 Deciding that disclosure thus posed
ing Honor and Ethics Code adjudications is held in the strictest confidence. The case
summaries, however, are posted to be read by current cadets and retained in the Acad-
emy's Honor and Ethics Code reading files and made available to future cadets. Addition-
ally, cadet Honor Representatives are permitted to discuss any aspect of the cases with
other cadets for their education. In cases where a cadet has been found guilty and dis-
charged from the Academy his name is disclosed. In not guilty cases or when a cadet has
been found guilty but allowed to remain at the Academy, the name is deleted. Id. at 266.
28. Id. at 267.
29. Id. The court explained that a senior Air Force officer and ex-cadet might read
a summary, or a reference to a summary, and realize for the first time that an officer under
his command had been the subject of an Honor and Ethics Code inquiry. Under such
circumstances, the court concluded that:
It would be cold comfort to the junior officer to be told that his chief had always
"known" the fact anyway, although he had long forgotten it or had never made the
ultimate connection among various bits of knowledge until the article jogged his
recollection.
Id.
30. Id. See note 27 supra.
31. Id.
32. Id. Arguing that the trying experience of being accused or found guilty of an
honor violation should, out of respect for the rights of the individuals, be as limited as
possible, the Academy's Honor and Ethics Code Executive stated:
Society in general does not understand the difference in the lying, cheating and
stealing that constitutes a Cadet Honor violation as opposed to the degree of crimi-
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"grave risks to . . . the affected cadets,"33 the Second Circuit
found that release of the summaries with only proper names de-
leted might constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal
privacy and, hence, might be forbidden by Exemption Six.34
However, without prior examination of the summaries, the
Second Circuit was unwilling to hold that Exemption Six defi-
nitely precluded disclosure of any or all of the case histories." The
final determination of that issue was remanded to the district
court to be made after an in camera inspection of the summa-
ries.3" The Second Circuit further ordered the Agency to assist the
district judge in redacting the case histories to delete both per-
sonal references and all other identifying information. Upon
completion of the redaction process the judge was to determine
whether disclosure of the sanitized summaries would constitute
a clearly unwarranted invasion of the affected cadets' privacy
and, thus be forbidden by Exemption Six."
To determine the scope of the protection afforded by Exemp-
tion Six, Judge Feinberg noted that "the key words . . . are 'a
clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy,' a wholly con-
clusory phrase, which requires a court to apply the statutory
standard without any definite guidelines." 9 The "clearly unwar-
ranted" limitation is intended to provide for a balance between
the protection of an individual's right of privacy and the public's
right to government information,40 albeit with the scales tipped
in favor of disclosure.4' In making this determination, a court
nality required in society at large to cause an equally serious type of censor [sic:
censurel.
Id. at 271.
33. Id. at 268.
34. Id.




39. Id. at 266.
40. The legislative history clearly supports this balance of interests. The Senate
Report states: "The phrase . . . enunciates a policy that will involve a balancing of
interests between the protection of an individual's private affairs from unnecessary public
scrutiny, and the preservation of the public's right to governmental information." S. REP.
No. 813, supra note 13, at 9. The House Report provides: "The limitation ... provides a
proper balance between the protection of an individual's right of privacy and the preserva-
tion of the public's right to Government information by excluding those kinds of files the
disclosure of which might harm the individual." H.R. REP. No. 1497, supra note 13, at
11.
41. Exemption Six can only be interpreted as preventing disclosure when the inva-
sion of privacy caused by release of the documents is clearly unwarranted. A finding that
disclosure would cause an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy is not sufficient to
1974]
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must not indulge in a balancing of the private interests of the
applicant with those of the person whose right of privacy is at
stake. The FOIA specifically calls for release of government infor-
mation to "any person,"4 thereby requiring disclosure without
consideration of the applicant's personal interest in the mate-
rial. '  However, there remains the still unsettled question of
whether the balancing process required by Exemption Six neces-
sitates an inquiry into the public's need for, or interest in, the
specific material sought. The two appellate decisions reaching the
merits of an Exemption Six claim prior to Rose espoused conflict-
ing approaches to this question.
In Getman v. NLRB,44 the District of Columbia Circuit or-
dered the agency to provide two labor law professors, engaged in
a study of union election tactics, with the names and addresses
of employees in certain plants where union elections were immi-
nent. The Getman court first found that disclosure of the re-
quested information would create only a minor invasion of the
employees' right of privacy. 5 To determine whether or not the
invasion was clearly unwarranted, the court proceeded to balance
the public interest purpose of the study and need for it, the quali-
fications of the applicants, and the impact that denial of disclo-
sure would have on the study against the extent of the invasion
involved.4" Following that formula, the court found that release
of the information was not clearly unwarranted and, in fact, char-
acterized disclosure as "clearly warranted."47
The plaintiff in Robles v. EPA4" sought disclosure of the re-
sults of an EPA survey containing the names and addresses of
persons whose homes were dangerously contaminated by radioac-
invoke the protection of Exemption Six. See DAVIS § 3A.22 (Supp. 1970). The Senate
Report also indicates that Congress resolved the conflict between the right of privacy and
the public's right to know in favor of the latter: "It is believed that the scope of the
exemption [Exemption Six] is held within bounds by the use of the limitation of 'a
clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.'" S. REP. No. 813, supra note 13, at 9.
42. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(3) (1970); see note 5 supra.
43. E.g., Hawkes v. IRS, 467 F.2d 787, 790 n.3 (6th Cir. 1972); Stokes v. Hodgson,
347 F. Supp. 1371, 1376 (N.D. Ga. 1972). See also DAVIS § 3A.4 (Supp. 1970); Koch, supra
note 14, at 195; Shredding the Paper Curtain, supra note 22, at 699.
44. 450 F.2d 670 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
45. Id. at 675. The court stated that, while release of the employees' names and
addresses would cause them to lose their anonymity, the disclosure would subject the
employees only to a telephone inquiry as to whether they would be willing to be inter-
viewed in connection with the study. The court also noted that bare names and addresses
reveal no information about individuals which would be embarassing. Id. at 674-75.
46. Id. at 675-77.
47. Id. at 677.
48. 484 F.2d 843 (4th Cir. 1973).
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tive ground fill. The district court upheld the Agency's refusal to
disclose the information on the basis of Exemption Six.49 On ap-
peal, the Fourth Circuit found the Agency's assertion that disclo-
sure would constitute a serious invasion of privacy to be only
speculative.50 Reversing the lower court's decision, the Fourth
Circuit observed that "the right to disclosure under the Act is not
to be resolved by a balancing of equities or a weighing of need or
even benefit."'" The EPA's claim that both the need of the public
and the interest of the plaintiff in securing the information were
negligible was rejected as "misconceiv[ing] the plain intent of
the Act" to provide disclosure to any person."2 The argument that
disclosure should be refused because it would do more harm than
good was dismissed as a plea for equitable relief having "nothing
to do with 'personal privacy'."5 Finally, the court found that the
contention that the information sought would be misunderstood
by the ordinary layman was not a basis for exemption under the
FOIA. .4
The theories of disclosure advanced in Getrman and Robles
are plainly conflicting. Under the Getman approach, a court must
balance the seriousness of the invasion of privacy against both the
value of the specific public interest purpose for which the infor-
mation is sought and the qualifications of the applicant.5 Con-
49. Id. at 845.
50. Id. at 847. In some instances, the EPA had promised householders that the
results of the survey would be kept confidential. Despite that promise, results regarding
specific houses in the survey had been disclosed to local government officials. Robles made
no determination of whether such disclosure had lessened the householders' right of pri-
vacy. The court emphasized, however, that the record showed neither an indication of any
householders' objections to such disclosure nor a case in which an individual had com-
plained of harm suffered by the disclosure. Id. at 846-47.
51. Id. at 848.
52. Id. at 847. The court stated that the inclusion of the phrase "any person" in the
FOIA "demonstrate[s] beyond argument that disclosure was never 'to depend upon the
interest or lack of interest of the party seeking disclosure.' " Id. at 847 (quoting DAvis §
3A.4 at 120 (Supp. 1970)).
53. Id. at 847. The Fourth Circuit further stated that: "While such argument has
received some limited support, the better reasoned authorities find no basis for the balanc-
ing of equities in the application of the Act; indeed the very language of the Act seems to
preclude its exercise." Id. See note 22 supra.
54. Id. at 848. The dissent in Rose, quoting the Academy's Honor and Ethics Execu-
tive, pointed out that the degree of "criminality" of a cadet charged with an Honor and
Ethics Code offense could be misunderstood by the general public. 495 F.2d at 271; see
note 32 supra. While the majority does not address this issue, it does not appear to be a
substantial problem. If only redacted summaries were released, any misunderstanding of
their contents could not affect the unidentifiable cadets.
55. This approach has been strongly criticized in Note, Invasion of Privacy and The
Freedom of Information Act: Getman v. NLRB, 40 GEo. WAsH. L. REv. 527 (1972). Rose
cited this note without commenting upon it. 495 F.2d at 267 n.16.
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versely, Robles declares that a court may only balance the magni-
tude of the proposed invasion against the FOIA's general policy
of liberal public disclosure. The Robles rationale precludes con-
sideration of either the specific public or private interest for
which the material is sought.
Rose is not a clear decision in favor of either theory. Although
the Second Circuit referred to Robles as a case reaching the mer-
its of an Exemption Six claim, the court failed to discuss the
Fourth Circuit's approach to the exemption." Similarly, while
Getman was cited as "[t]he only opinion at all on point," 7 the
Second Circuit did not analyze the balancing process utilized by
the District of Columbia Circuit. Judge Feinberg characterized
Getman as "a much stronger case for the plaintiffs than ours"
because the invasion of privacy in the former case was only
minor.55 The Second Circuit's discussion of the "clearly unwar-
ranted" inquiry focused solely on the magnitude of the conse-
quences which could attend disclosure of the summaries." Al-
though Judge Feinberg had previously explained both Rose's
need for the case histories"' and the public's legitimate interest
in the functioning of the Cadet Honor and Ethics Code,' neither
factor was mentioned in the discussion of Exemption Six. Signifi-
cantly, the Second Circuit, unlike the courts deciding either
Robles or Getman, found that disclosure of the requested mate-
rial could produce a serious invasion of privacy. In view of that
finding and the ambiguity of the court's discussion of the "clearly
unwarranted" inquiry, Rose supports only the basic proposition
that when disclosure could produce grave consequences, both the
public's and the plaintiffs interest in the material sought must
yield to "our society's expanding concern for the protection of
privacy."2
However, "[iun order to keep faith with the Act's overall
mandate,""3 the Second Circuit ordered the district court to im-
plement a redaction procedure to accommodate society's concern
for personal privacy and provide liberal public access to govern-
56. Id.
57. 495 F.2d at 267.
58. Id.
59. See text accompanying note 32 supra.
60. See text accompanying note 3 supra.
61. The court found a public interest "in the treatment of cadets, whose education
is publicly financed and who furnish a good portion of the country's future military
leadership." 495 F.2d at 265.
62. Id. at 267-68.
63. Id. at 268.
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ment information. The in camera redaction process involves a
technique not heretofore utilized in Exemption Six cases.14 Upon
determining that an agency has failed to prove the applicability
of an exemption 5 through testimony or affidavits, a court may
order an in camera inspection of the document in question.66
Whether a court may further order deletion of identifying matter
in an attempt to remove the documents from the protection of
Exemption Six is debatable.6"
The FOIA specifically authorized deletion of identifying de-
tails in agency opinions, statements of policy, interpretations,
staff manuals and instructions "[t]o the extent required to pre-
vent a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy. ... 68
The Act, however, makes no similar provision with regard to pro-
duction of records. The statutory language of Exemption Six
shields from disclosure "matters that are . . . personnel and
medical files and similar files. . . .,o A literal reading of this
phraseology suggests that an entire file may be exempt from dis-
closure if release of any part of the file would constitute a clearly
unwarranted invasion of personal privacy. The legislative history
pertaining to Exemption Six," however, indicates that Congress
64. In Getman and Robles, deletion of identifying information was inappropriate
because the plaintiffs specifically sought names and addresses.
65. The FOIA specifically places the burden on the agency to sustain its refusal to
disclose materials. 5 U.S.C. §552(a)(3) (1970). See note 5 supra. The legislative history of
the FOIA clearly explains the rationale behind this assignment of the burden of proof:
"Placing the burden of proof upon the agency puts the task of justifying the withholding
on the only party able to explain it. The private party can hardly be asked to prove that
an agency has improperly withheld public information because he will not know the
reasons for the agency action." S. REP. No. 813, supra note 13, at 8. See H.R. REP. No.
1497, supra note 13, at 9.
66. EPA v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73, 93 (1973).
67. See Gianella, Agency Procedures Implementing the Freedom of Information Act:
A Proposal for Uniform Regulations, 23 AD. L. REV. 217, 241 (1970) [hereinafter cited as
Gianellal; ATrORNEY GENERAL'S MEMORANDUM ON THE PUBUC INFORMATION SECTION OF THE
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT (1967), reprinted in 20 AD. L. REv. 263, 305-306 (1968)
I hereinafter cited as ATrORNEY GENERAL'S MEMORANDUM, page references to the AD. L.
REv.I; DAVIS § 3A.22 (Supp. 1970). Professors Gianella and Davis suggest that entire files
should be disclosed if suitable deletions can be made. The Attorney General, however,
appears to adopt the position that entire files must be withheld.
68. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(2) (1970).
69. See note 5 supra.
70. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(6) (1970); see note 5 supra.
71. The Senate Report states: "For example, health, welfare, and selective service
records are highly personal to the person involved, yet facts concerning the award of a
pension or benefit should be disclosed to the public." S. REP. No. 813, supra note 13, at
9. (emphasis added). The House Report is in accord:
The exemption is also intended to cover detailed Government records on an individ-
ual which can be identified as applying to that individual and not the facts concern-
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intended that the language be read to exclude only those particu-
lar matters within files, disclosure of which could constitute a
clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.72
Rose ignores the Act's semantic entanglement and allows
deletion of names and other identifying information. The result
in Rose is consistent with the FOIA's overall disclosure philoso-
phy and, more specifically, with the statutory goal of Exemption
Six Which the Second Circuit described as "a workable compro-
mise between individual rights 'and the preservation of public
rights to government information.' "I'
While laudably in keeping with the spirit of the FOIA, the
result in Rose is not without certain drawbacks. As the dissent
pointed out, the redaction procedure adopted by the majority
imposes a burden on the time resources of both the court and the
agency.7 This difficulty, however, is certainly not insurmounta-
ble. The FOIA specifically requires the agencies to make avail-
able for copying all final opinions and orders made in the adjudi-
cation of cases" and authorizes deletion of identifying informa-
tion from those and other agency documents.76 The techniques
presently utilized by agencies to edit these publications may pro-
vide a readily adaptable mechanism for making similar deletions
in files that may be within the protection of Exemption Six.
Further, the burden on the court may be substantially alleviated
if the court were to appoint a master to assist the trial judge in
examining and evaluating the documents.77
ing the award of a pension or benefit or the compilation of unidentified statistical
information from personal records.
H.R. REP. No. 1497, supra note 13, at 11 (emphasis added).
72. It is submitted that disclosure of factual portions of a file after deletion of names
and all other identifying information could not constitute a "clearly unwarranted invasion
of personal privacy." If the person with whom the file is concerned can not be identified,
his privacy can not be invaded.
73. 495 F.2d at 269 (quoting H.R. REP. No. 1497, supra note 13, at 11).
74. 495 F.2d at 272. The dissent stated that the redaction process "saddles . . . a
needless burden upon an important branch of our military forces, and . . . an equally
important judicial branch." Id. Judge Feinberg, responding to the dissent's "gloomy pre-
diction," predicted that "once agreement is reached on general principles of reduction,
the actual process of editing the summaries should not take undue amounts of time." Id.
at 269 n.21.
In EPA v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73 (1973), the Supreme Court noted that in some cases the
in camera inspection need not include all of the requested documents. Instead, a court
may simply view a sampling of the material. Id. at 93. A sample inspection could not be
used by the district court in Rose because of the redaction process mandated by the
Second Circuit.
75. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(2) (1970).
76. Id. See text accompanying note 68 supra.
77. See Vaughn v. Rosen, 484 F.2d 820, 828 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
[VOL. XXXIV
FOIA-DIsCLOSURE OF CASE SUMMARIES
The judicial and administrative efforts demanded by the
Second Circuit are supported by ample authority. 8 Courts inter-
preting the FOIA have frequently found it necessary to order
tedious judicial and agency evaluation and editing of individual
documents. 9 Further, some agencies have voluntarily promul-
gated regulations requiring the agency to delete exempt informa-
tion and release the balance of the requested record.8 In view of
this authority, the public's vital need for ready access to govern-
ment information, and the FOIA's dominant purpose of enhanc-
ing that access, there is strong support for the Rose redaction
procedure, despite the imposition of some burden on court and
agency.
CREDITORS' RIGHTS- FAILURE OF MARYLAND RULES To PRO-
VIDE FOR ADEQUATE JUDICIAL REVIEW IN THE ISSUANCE OF A WRIT
OF ATTACHMENT Is A DENIAL OF DUE PROCESS -Roscoe v. Butler.'
Creditors of both James C. Roscoe and Julene Wright filed
actions in the District Court of Maryland to recover the money
owed them. In each case two summonses were returned non est
against the debtors, and the creditors then filed petitions for writs
of attachment on original process, pursuant to Annotated Code
of Maryland art. 9 §1(b)3 and Maryland District Rules G 40(b),4
78. See notes 79-80 infra.
79. See, e.g., Wellford v. Hardin, 315 F. Supp. 768, 770 (D.D.C. 1970), aff'd 444 F.2d
21 (4th Cir. 1971) ("It is a violation of the Act to withhold documents on the ground that
parts are exempt and parts nonexempt. In that event 'suitable deletion' may be
made .. "); Grumman Aircraft Engineering Corp. v. Renegotiation Bd., 425 F.2d 578,
580-81 (D.C. Cir. 1970) ("The statutory history does not indicate ... that Congress
intended to exempt an entire document merely because it contained some confidential
information."); Bristol-Myers Co. v. FTC, 424 F.2d 935, 938-39 (D.C. Cir. 1970) ("The
court may well conclude that portions of the requested material are protected, and it may
be that identifying details or secret matters can be deleted from a document to render it
subject to disclosure.") For a critical analysis of such interpretations, termed "the present
draconian approach of the judiciary", see Koch, supra note 14, at 203-224.
80. For example, the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare has issued a
regulation which provides: "In the event that any record contains both information which
is discloseable and that which is not discloseable under this regulation, the undiscloseable
information will be deleted and the balance of the record disclosed." 45 C.F.R. § 5.70
(1973).
1. 367 F. Supp. 574 (D. Md. 1973).
2. Non est inventus, literally, he is not found. The term indicates that service of
process was not accomplished because the defendant could not be located.
3. This statute, which authorized the issuance of a writ of attachment on original
process, may be found at ch. 181, § 9, [1972] Md. Laws 555.
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both of which provided for the issuance of such a writ against the
property of "a resident defendant after two summonses has [sic]
been returned non est to two separate return days." Shortly after
the filing of these petitions, separate writs of attachment were
issued by the clerk of the district court, and constables, under the
supervision of the defendant in the instant action, J. Jerome But-
ler, Chief Constable of the District Court of Maryland, moved
quickly to seize the personal property' of each of the debtors. Both
attachments were made without prior notice, without offering the
debtors an opportunity to be heard and before entering any judg-
ment in favor of the creditors.
The debtors brought this action in the United States District
Court for the District of Maryland challenging the constitution-
ality of attachment on original process following the return of two
summonses non est. The plaintiff-debtors requested the court to
enter a declaratory judgment in their favor and to enjoin the
defendant permanently from executing any writs of attachment
issued pursuant to the statute and rules under consideration. The
court granted the plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment' and
The Maryland legislature has begun to revise the entire ANNOTATED CODE of
MARYLAND in an effort to facilitate its use. The laws of attachment were among the first
to be reorganized and, effective January 1, 1974, the statutes pertaining to attachment
are found in MD. ANN. CODE, Cts. & Jud. Proc. Art. §§ 3-301 to 305 (1974). Thus, art. 9,
§ 1(b) [ch. 181, § 9, [1972] Md. Laws 555] were re-codified as Cts. & Jud. Proc. Art.,
§ 3-303(c). The recodification of these sections was accompanied principally by changes
in style, not in substance.
However, as a result of Roscoe, the Maryland General Assembly passed House Emer-
gency Bill No. 1518 (now cited as ch. 571, § 1, [1974] Md. Laws 1937) on March 28, 1974,
signed into law by the Governor April 30, 1974, which deleted the return of two summonses
non est as a ground for the issuance of a writ of attachment on original process. See text
accompanying notes 54 & 55 infra.
4. Pursuant to the opinion in Roscoe, the Maryland District Rules G 40-60 (1972)
(hereinafter cited as M.D.R. G 40-60) were substantially amended by the Maryland Court
of Appeals, effective May 7, 1974. For the original wording, as well as the amended version
of pertinent sections see notes 13 & 14 infra.
5. Mr. Roscoe's automobile and Mrs. Wright's household goods were the articles
named by their respective creditors. The automobile was attached immediately upon
issuance of the writ. Mrs. Wright was persuaded to give up her savings account passbook
so that the constables were able to withdraw sufficient funds to cover the debt plus charges
and costs. 367 F. Supp. at 576.
6. The court, relying on the reasoning contained in the supplemental memorandum
to Schneider v. Margossian, 349 F. Supp. 741 (D. Mass. 1972) (three-judge court), declined
to certify either the defendants or the plaintiffs as representatives of a class. In Schneider,
facing circumstances analogous to those in Roscoe, the court explained: "[Wihere retro-
active relief is inappropriate, no purpose is served by allowing the plaintiffs to sue as
representatives of a class." 349 F. Supp. at 746. The court stressed that FED. R. Crv. P.
23(b), pertaining to class actions, gives a court wide discretion. The court in Schneider
also refused to exercise its discretionary power to declare the defendants as representatives
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held that M.D.R. G 44,7 insofar as it was intended to implement
the statute and rule quoted above, was unconstitutional as viola-
tive of the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment of the
Constitution of the United States,' because it permitted issuance
of the writ without adequate judicial review.
After explaining the rather unique jurisdictional basis of the
case,9 the court gave a brief history of the process of attachment
in Maryland. 0 The controlling laws" authorizing attachment
of a class, although it was admittedly permissible to do so. The court was "not persuaded
by the prospect of other district court clerks proceeding in disregard" of its decision and,
hence, found certification purposeless. Id. at 746.
7. M.D.R. G 44 (1972), as amended M.D.R. G 44 (1974). For the original wording,
as well as the amended version, see note 14 infra.
8. "[Nlor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without
due process of law ...." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
9. Plaintiffs sought relief as provided for under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970):
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom,
or usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen
of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the depriva-
tion of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws,
shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper
proceeding for redress.
The jurisdiction of the district court was invoked on the basis of 28 U.S.C. § 1343 (3)
(1970):
The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action authorized
by law to be commenced by any person: .. .(3) To redress the deprivation under
color of any state law, statute, ordinance, regulation, custom or usage, of any right,
privilege or immunity secured by the Constitution of the United States or by any
Act of Congress providing for equal rights of citizens or of all persons within the
jurisdiction of the United States ...
Whenever an injunction is sought to prevent the enforcement of a state statute on the
grounds of unconstitutionality, 28 U.S.C. § 2281 (1970) requires that the application be
heard and determined by a district court of three judges. The term "State statute",
contained in 18 U.S.C. § 2281, has been construed by the United States Supreme Court
to mean any statute or regulation, promulgated or authorized by the state legislature and
which is applied throughout the state or represents a statewide policy. Board of Regents
v. New Left Education Project, 404 U.S. 541 (1972).
In the instant case, the court's attention was focused on M.D.R. G 40-60 (1972).
Since the opening statement of the rules announces that they were adopted by the Court
of Appeals of Maryland to have the force of law, as authorized by MD. CONST. art. IV, §§
1 and 18, implemented by MD. ANN. CODE, Cts. & Jud. Proc. Art., § 1-201 (a) (1974), and
since the jurisdiction of the District Court of Maryland is uniform throughout the state
under MD. CONST. art. IV, § 41A, the three-judge federal district court in Roscoe reasoned
that M.D.R. G 40-60 (1972) constituted state statutes within the meaning of 28 U.S.C.
§ 2281 (1970).
10. The concept of attachment has been a firmly established remedy for Maryland
creditors since its initial incorporation into the laws of Maryland by the Act of 1715.
Chapter 40, Section II of the Act provided that an attachment would be awarded against
the property of a resident defendant if two successive summonses had been issued against
the defendant, and if, in both instances, the sheriff had returned them non est (see note
2 supra). The courts in Maryland have consistently held that in such a case, where there
have been "two returns of non est to two successive writs of summons, then the Judge is
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after the return of two summonses non est were essentially the
same as the original version enacted in 1715.12 The Maryland
District Rules specified the procedure to be followed by the credi-
tor to obtain such a writ. A plaintiff-creditor was required to file
certain papers with the clerk of the court, including: (a) a state-
ment setting forth the creditor's claim; (b) either the creditor's
own affidavit or an affidavit in his behalf, asserting a bona fide
belief that the plaintiff is entitled to the issuance of a writ of
attachment; (c) documentary evidence of all material papers or
parts thereof which constitute a basis for the claim, or an affida-
vit to explain their absence; and (d) instructions to the sheriff
describing the property of the debtor to be attached.' 3 Upon the
filing of these documents, according to the rules, "[tihe clerk
shall issue a writ of attachment against the property of the defen-
dant . "4
Writing for the three-judge district court, Chief Judge North-
rup relied primarily on Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp.'5 and
Fuentes v. Shevin.'6 In Sniadach the Supreme Court found that
Wisconsin's garnishment law violated the due process clause of
the fourteenth amendment by failing to provide a debtor with
notice or a hearing before his wages were subjected to prejudg-
ment garnishment. There was disagreement in the lower courts'7
authorized to regard such returns as evidence that the defendant is a non-resident or
absconding debtor .... ." Randle v. Mellen, 67 Md. 181, 189, 8 A. 573, 575 (1887);
Dirickson v. Shewell, 79 Md. 49, 51-52, 28 A. 896, 897 (1894).
11. See text accompanying notes 3 & 4 supra.
12. See note 10 supra.
13. M.D.R. G 42 (a-d) (1972). As a result of Roscoe, rule G 42 (b) has been amended
so that it is no longer adequate simply to proffer to the court "an affidavit by the plaintiff
or by some person on the plaintiffs behalf, setting forth that he knows or is credibly
informed and verily believes that the plaintiff is entitled to the issuance of attachment
..... " M.D.R. G 42(b) (1972). Instead, the affidavit must now include "facts upon which
plaintiff claims he is entitled to the issuance of attachment ..... M.D.R. G 42(b)
(1974). M.D.R. G 42 (a, c, d) were not altered.
14. M.D.R. G 44 (1972) (emphasis added). The amended rule now states:
The writ of attachment on original process shall issue only after court review
of the documents required by M.D.R. (G42) (Documents to be filed). The court may
require plaintiff to supplement or explain any of the matters set forth in the docu-
ments. If the court determines that the writ of attachment should issue both as to
the action and as to the defendant against whom it is asserted, the court shall direct
issuance of the writ.
M.D.R. G 44 (1974).
15. 395 U.S. 337 (1969).
16. 407 U.S. 67 (1972).
17. See, e.g., Brunswick Corp. v. J. & P., Inc., 424 F.2d 100 (10th Cir. 1970) (distin-
guishing Sniadach as inapplicable to a case involving enforcement of a security interest);
Laprease v. Raymors Furniture Co., 315 F. Supp. 716 (N.D.N.Y. 1970) (three judge court)
(interpreting Sniadach to apply only in cases involving deprivation of specialized types
of property which are necessities of everyday life).
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concerning the scope of the holding, because the Court seemed to
limit its effect to only those types of property considered indis-
pensable to normal day-to-day living.'" The uncertainty was re-
solved two years later in Fuentes, where the Court ruled that a
state's authorization of a prejudgment seizure of any property of
a debtor violates the fourteenth amendment, unless the debtor is
given prior notice and an opportunity to be heard. The opinion
left no doubt that for the purpose of protecting the individual's
"use and possession of property from arbitrary encroachment","I
the Court, has in the past, insisted that notice and an "opportun-
ity for [a] hearing must be provided before the deprivation at
issue takes effect. ' 20
Nevertheless, the Court in Sniadach 2 and Fuentes2 2 reaf-
firmed the proposition that in certain "extraordinary situations"
a summary procedure for the seizure of property may meet the
requirements of due process without according the defendant no-
tice and an opportunity to be heard. Justice Stewart, writing for
the majority in Fuentes, characterized the "truly unusual" situa-
tions thus:
First, in each case, the seizure has been directly neces-
sary to secure an important governmental or general public
interest. Second, there has been a special need for very
prompt action. Third, the State has kept strict control over
its monopoly of legitimate force: the person initiating the
seizure has been a government official responsible for deter-
mining, under the standards of a narrowly drawn statute,
that it was necessary and justified in the particular in-
stance.
23
In his use of that characterization as a test of the facts of the
instant case, Judge Northrup dealt separately with each of the
three parts and concluded that the Maryland statute and rules
which authorized the issuance of a writ of attachment on the
return of two summonses non est failed to measure up to the
standard set by the third part of the Fuentes test.
First, he determined that this means of exercising quasi in
rem 4 jurisdiction by the district court protected a valid public
18. 395 U.S. at 340-42.
19. 407 U.S. at 81.
20. Id. at 82.
21. 395 U.S. at 339.
22. 407 U.S. at 90-91.
23. Id. at 91.
24. A term applied to proceedings which are . . . brought against the defen-
19741
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
interest, as understood by the Fuentes Court. In Fuentes attach-
ment of property without a prior hearing was approved only when
''necessary to secure jurisdiction in state court-clearly a most
basic and important public interest." 5 The Court cited and relied
upon Ownbey v. Morgan6 and, thus, reaffirmed the holding of
that case, where attachment of a non-resident's property was the
only means available to secure jurisdiction for the state court,
and, incidentally, to compel the appearance of a non-resident
debtor. The Court in Ownbey stated, "[A] property owner who
absents himself from the territorial jurisdiction of a State, leaving
his property within it, must be deemed . . . to consent that the
State may subject such property to judicial process to answer
demands made against him in his absence . ".2.."7
Considerable controversy has arisen concerning the import of
the Fuentes phrase-"necessary to secure jurisdiction." The dis-
cussion" has focused on whether the exercise of quasi in rem
jurisdiction by summary attachment is justified when other
means29 are available to obtain in personam jurisdiction over a
defendant. Judge Northrup expressed no view on the controversy,
but decided that the rationale behind the statement in Fuentes
was controlling in the instant case. He found: "The return of
summonses twice non est is ample evidence that in personam
jurisdiction is not available, and consequently, the only way in
which a state can assert its jurisdiction over the defendant is by
use of a quasi in rem action."3
This finding is undermined by the facts of the present case:
since Mr. Butler's car was seized at his home in Maryland, it
seems fair to infer that he was, indeed, available for service of
dant personally, though the real object is to deal with particular property or to
subject property to the discharge of claims asserted ....
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 900 (4th ed. 1951).
25. 407 U.S. at 91 n.23.
26. 256 U.S. 94 (1921).
27. Id. at 111.
28. Most courts have found "necessity" merely from the non-resident status of the
defendant. E.g., U.S. Industries, Inc. v. Gregg, 348 F. Supp. 1004, 1021 (D. Del. 1972);
Schneider v. Margossian, 349 F. Supp. 741, 744 (D. Mass. 1972). Some commentators,
however, assert an alternative proposition that "attachment necessary to secure jurisdic-
tion" means that attachment is justified only when it is the single method by which the
state can obtain jurisdiction. E.g., Note, Quasi in Rem Jurisdiction and Due Process
Requirements, 82 YALE L.J. 1023, 1029-34 (1973); accord Tucker v. Burton, 319 F. Supp.
567, 577-78 (D.D.C. 1970) (Wright, J., dissenting). A short, well-reasoned exposition of
these contrasting points of view can be found in Hawkland, The Seed of Sniadach: Flower
or Weed?, 78 CoM. L.J. 245, 250 (1973).
29. E.g., a Long Arm Statute such as MD. ANN. CODE, Cts. & Jud. Proc. Art., § 6-
103 (1974).
30. 367 F. Supp. at 580.
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process, and similarly Mrs. Wright was actually found at her
home and persuaded to part with her savings account passbook.3'
In light of these facts, it is easy to understand why the plaintiffs
claimed that, even after the return of two summonses non est, the
creditor should have been required to exhaust all possible meth-
ods of securing in personam jurisdiction 3 before the extraordinary
remedy of prejudgment attachment without notice or hearing
became necessary.
Judge Northrup admitted, "If the only public interest to be
served by the summary seizure after two non ests is the securing
of State jurisdiction, the position of the plaintiffs may have some
merit. '33 Therefore, to bolster his faltering premise, the judge
maintained that there is also a legitimate public interest, accord-
ing to Fuentes, in protecting a creditor's rights against a debtor,
at least where there is evidence that he is evading service of
process or that he may abscond. Judge Northrup noted that, in
Maryland, the return of two summonses non est has always raised
the presumption that the debtor is absconding.34
If the judge, in his supporting argument, meant to say that
protecting the creditor's purely private rights against a debtor
rises to the level of an important public interest, his position is
clearly insupportable in light of Fuentes.3 1 In that case, the Su-
preme Court stated that the Florida and Pennsylvania replevin
statutes, therein considered, did not serve any important public
interest by allowing "summary seizure of a person's possessions
when no more than private gain is directly at stake. 136 Also, while
the Court in Sniadach spoke of "a state or creditor interest" 7 as
sufficient to justify state intervention, in Fuentes, this language
had evolved to "an important governmental or general public
interest. ' '3 1 Thus, in Fuentes, the Supreme Court seemed to be
31. Id. at 576.
32. E.g., appointment by the court of a special process server, as authorized by
M.D.R. 116 (1972), or securing personal service, pursuant to M.D.R. 104 (h) (1972) which
allows delivery of a copy of the original pleading and summons to the last known address
of the defendant and to a person of suitable age and discretion at the place of business or
usual place of abode of the defendant within the State.
33. 367 F. Supp. at 580.
34. See note 10 supra.
35. See Clark and Landers, Sniadach, Fuentes and Beyond: The Creditor Meets the
Constitution, 59 VA. L. REV. 355, 369 (1973).
36. 407 U.S. at 92.
37. 395 U.S. at 339.
38. 407 U.S. at 91. It has been suggested that this change indicates the view that
issues of a broad public nature must be involved before a court is justified in authorizing
the summary seizure of a person's property. Note, Quasi in Rem Jurisdiction and Due
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saying that a simple creditor-debtor relationship is not of suffi-
cient interest to the public to warrant state intervention in the
form of summary seizure of the debtor's property.
There remains an alternative interpretation of Judge North-
rup's supporting argument." Debtors who are evading service or
who are absconding are effectively depriving the court of jurisdic-
tion over them; therefore, a court is acting to protect a general
public interest when it authorizes attachment in that situation.
If this is the thrust of Judge Northrup's second proposition, it
merges with the first argument-admittedly weak-and can
stand on no stronger ground. The facts of the instant case clearly
demonstrate that, despite the return of two summonses non est
against each debtor, in personam jurisdiction might still have
been obtained over them and that attachment of their property
in order to secure jurisdiction for the district court was prema-
ture.
In the final analysis, the district court determined that the
use of attachment to gain jurisdiction for the court and to prevent
a debtor from evading service or absconding protects a "public
interest" sufficient to satisfy the first element of the Fuentes test.
Nevertheless, in a situation where other methods remained by
which the court might have obtained in personam jurisdiction
over the debtor-as in Roscoe-it is less than certain whether the
use of a quasi in rem action is permissible under a strict interpre-
tation of the Fuentes guidelines.
The second element of the Fuentes test requires that there
be "a special need for very prompt action." By way of example,
the Court suggested where "a creditor could make a showing of
immediate danger that a debtor will destroy or conceal disputed
goods."40 However, no specific examples were given. Judge North-
rup did not explicitly state that the instant case fulfilled this
requirement, but he apparently assumed that there was a need
for prompt action. The judge referred to the presumption in
Maryland that a debtor is absconding if two non ests have been
returned against him and asserted the common sense view that a
debtor's flight could occur at any time and may be more likely
Process Requirements, 82 YALE L.J. 1023, 1028 n.33 (1973). Examples of those situations
which the Fuentes Court found to be of sufficient "governmental or general public inter-
est" are "to collect the internal revenue of the United States, to meet the needs of a
national war effort, to protect against the economic disaster of bank failure, and to protect
the public from misbranded drugs and contaminated food." 407 U.S. at 92 (footnotes
omitted).
39. 367 F. Supp. at 580.
40. 407 U.S. at 93.
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"when suit is finally initiated."'" This reasoning has been criti-
cized-if a debtor wishes to abscond, he will have had ample
opportunity to do so long before attachment takes place. While
neither hypothesis seems very seductive, the inference of a need
for haste, which may arise in the abstract from the return of two
summonses non est, is rebutted here by the additional facts. The
statute43 required that there be summonses returned twice non est
to two separate return days before the writ of attachment could
issue. Since a return day is defined in Maryland as the first Mon-
day of each month,4" there was a considerable period between the
time that service of process was first attempted and the writ was
issued. In fact, six months elapsed between the return of the
second non est against Mr. Roscoe and the filing of the petition
for a writ of attachment by his creditors. 5 It is difficult to estab-
lish the need for prompt action on these facts.
Perhaps recognizing these criticisms and anomalies, Judge
Northrup stated, "The return twice non est is a reasonable indicia
of an intention to abscond and when sufficiently supported by
other evidence can give rise to the need for prompt action."4
Requiring additional evidence of the debtor's intention to remove
himself and his possessions from the jurisdiction of the court
would certainly relieve some of the problems in this procedure,
but Maryland's federal district court has previously noted that
there will be few instances when a seller will be able to submit
sufficient information about a specific debtor to support such an
allegation. 7 Furthermore, Judge Northrup did not specify what
form this supplemental evidence might take, nor did his opinion
give any clues as to what additional information would be ade-
quate to support the need for prompt action.
The final guideline of the Fuentes three-pronged test is the
41. 367 F. Supp. at 581.
42. Blair v. Pitchess, 5 Cal.3d 258, 278, 486 P.2d 1242, 1256, 96 Cal. Rptr. 42, 56
(1971), where the court, quoting Longfellow, stated that the opportunity for a hearing "will
not substantially increase the risk that . . . [the debtors] 'Shall fold their tents, like
Arabs, And as silently steal away.'"
43. See text accompanying notes 3 and 4 supra.
44. MD. R.P. 102 (1971).
45. 367 F. Supp. at 582.
46. Id. at 581.
47. Wheeler v. Adams Co., 322 F. Supp. 645, 657 (D. Md. 1971). One commentator
has pointed out that since the procedure of prejudgment attachment without prior notice
or hearing represents a narrow exception to the normal due process requirements, the
burden of proving the existence of the special situation demanding immediate action must
be placed upon the creditor, despite the inherent difficulty in obtaining evidence to sup-




most difficult for any prejudgment remedy to satisfy. It requires
that the state keep a "strict control over its monopoly of legiti-
mate force" and that the person authorizing the seizure must be
''a governmental official responsible for determining under the
standards of a narrowly drawn statute, that it was necessary and
justified in a particular instance."48 The court in Roscoe found
that this element of the test requires that the state official respon-
sible for issuing the writ of attachment be invested with the au-
thority to perform the following specific functions:49 first, he must
be empowered to determine whether the documents submitted by
the creditor constitute a prima facie claim against the debtor;"
second, the official must be allowed to question the sufficiency of
the creditor's explanation if the creditor fails to file any of the
material papers and, instead, tenders an affidavit to explain their
absence, as permitted by M.D.R. G 42(c) (1972); third, he must
have the power to order an ex parte hearing with the creditor if
there is a substantial doubt as to the justification for the attach-
ment; and, fourth, the state official must be authorized to investi-
gate further, to determine if there really is a need for prompt
action. Inasmuch as the clerk's authority in issuing writs of at-
tachment under M.D.R. G 44 (1972) included none of these pow-
ers, Judge Northrup declared the rule unconstitutional.
The court emphasized that due process demands that the
official responsible for issuing the writ of attachment must be
given the power to go beyond the documentary evidence to ascer-
tain the need for summary attachment-for example, by means
48. 407 U.S. at 91.
49. The Court in Roscoe was interpreting the following paragraph from Fuentes, in
which the Supreme Court sought to explain the third part of its test:
The statutes, moreover, abdicate effective state control over state power. Pri-
vate parties, serving their own private advantage, may unilaterally invoke state
power to replevy goods from another. No state official participates in the decision
to seek a writ; no state official reviews the basis for the claim to repossession; and
no state official evaluates the need for immediate seizure. There is not even a
requirement that the plaintiff provide any information to the court on these mat-
ters. The State acts largely in the dark.
407 U.S. at 93 (footnotes omitted).
50. As Judge Northrup pointed out, under M.D.R. G 42 (1972), a creditor might
have submitted documents which represented the basis of a claim while not constituting
a prima facie claim, arising ex contractu. 367 F. Supp. at 582. Still, this distinction seems
to afford little additional protection to a debtor. As one court noted:
It might be argued that the creditors' supporting affidavit makes out a prima
facie case of reasonable grounds without the necessity of a hearing prior to seizure.
The answer is that most affidavits are pro forma, based on hearsay and speculation,
and even the creditor may not know of a valid defense the debtor has to the action.
Making out a prima facie case does not necessarily win a case.
Kosches v. Nichols, 68 Misc. 2d 795, 327 N.Y.S. 2d 968, 970 (Civ. Ct. City of N.Y. 1971).
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of an ex parte hearing with the creditor-and that, necessarily,
the official must be allowed to deny the issuance of the writ if he
finds the petition somehow lacking. However, the court also
pointed out that an ex parte hearing may not be necessary in
every case. In fact, Judge Northrup concluded that the vast ma-
jority of petitions for a writ of attachment on two returns non est
may be properly granted after only a review of the documents.
The Court in Fuentes recognized the possibilities of abuse
inherent in an ex parte procedure5 and one federal district court
simply stated that "the protection offered by such an ex parte
determination is largely illusory."5 Therefore, it seems of little
value to the debtor to invest the official responsible for issuing the
writ with the power to call such a hearing. Furthermore, the
conclusion that most writs of attachment after two returns non
est may be issued after no more than a review of the documents
simply ignores the constitutional criticism which has been di-
rected towards such a proceeding. One of the major elements of
dissatisfaction with prejudgment remedies is that they have been
most often granted after a perfunctory examination of the re-
quired documents.53
51. Justice Stewart stated in his opinion in Fuentes:
[Wihen a person has an opportunity to speak up in his own defense, and when
the State must listen to what he has to say, substantively unfair and simply mis-
taken deprivations of property interests can be prevented. It has long been recog-
nized that "fairness can rarely be obtained by secret, one-sided determination of
facts decisive of rights ...[and n]o better instrument has been devised for arriv-
ing at truth than to give a person in jeopardy of serious loss notice of the case
against him and an opportunity to meet it."
407 U.S. at 81 (citations omitted).
However, to the extent that Fuentes has been interpreted as standing for the proposi-
tion that, except in extraordinary circumstances, a state must afford a person notice and
an opportunity for a hearing before acting to deprive him of property, it has been tempered
by the recent decision of the Supreme Court in Mitchell v. W. T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600,
(1974). The Court in Mitchell decided that it was not constrained to follow the holding in
Fuentes, because the facts in the two cases were sufficiently distinguishable. Furthermore,
the statute upheld in Mitchell differed from those struck down in Roscoe in at least two
significant considerations: (1) the statute in Mitchell allowed sequestration in a shared
title situation, and (2) they provided for adequate judicial review before the writ of seques-
tration would issue. For an in-depth analysis of Mitchell see 34 MD. L. REv. 421 supra.
52. U.S. Industries v. Gregg, 348 F. Supp. 1004, 1022 (D. Del. 1972).
53. See Geisinger v. Voss, 352 F. Supp. 104, 110-11 (B.D. Wis. 1972); Cedar Rapids
Eng. Co. v. Haenelt, 68 Misc. 2d 206, 326 N.Y.S. 2d 653, 658 (Sup. Ct. Sullivan Cty. 1971),
aff'd, 39 App. Div. 2d 275, 333 N.Y.S. 2d 953 (1972), motion for leave to appeal dismissed,
339 N.Y.S. 2d 106 (case 2), 31 N.Y.2d 780, 291 N.E. 2d 387 (1972); Kosches v. Nichols, 68
Misc. 2d 795, 327 N.Y.S. 2d 968, 970 (Civ. Ct. City of N.Y. 1971). Cf. 48 WASH. L. REV.
646, 659-661 (1973). Assuming that most state officials involved will rarely attempt inves-
tigation into the validity of the creditor's claim, the state in effect may become no more
than the collection agent of the creditor.
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As a result of the opinion in Roscoe, several changes have
been incorporated into the statute and rules pertaining to the
process of obtaining a writ of attachment in Maryland.54 It is
particularly noteworthy that on March 28, 1974 the Maryland
legislature passed House Bill 1518 as an Emergency Bill to delete
the return of two summonses non est as a ground for the issuance
of a writ of attachment on original process and inserted in its
stead the provision that a writ of attachment may issue, "[i]f a
resident individual defendant . . . has acted to evade service.""
Furthermore, by enumerating additional safeguards to be in-
cluded in the judicial review of the creditor's petition for a writ
of attachment and its accompanying documents, the court in
Roscoe has perhaps complied with the spirit of Fuentes. Never-
theless, neither the statutory amendments to the process, nor the
opinion in Roscoe has answered two substantial questions regard-
ing the Maryland procedure for issuing writs of attachment
against a resident debtor:
(1) whether such an attachment, utilized by the state court
to secure quasi in rem jurisdiction, protects a sufficiently "impor-
tant governmental or general public interest" to justify the sum-
mary seizure of a debtor's property, where there remain other
means of obtaining in personam jurisdiction; and,
(2) what supplemental evidence, in addition to the return
of two summonses non est, must a creditor submit in order for the
state court to determine that a debtor is acting to evade service
and thus presents "a special need for very prompt action."
CRIMINAL LAW-CREDIT FOR PRE-SENTENCE CONFINE-
MENT-Mohr v. Jordan.'
Petitioners brought a federal habeas corpus action seeking
credit for time spent in confinement before trial.' The petitioners
54. See notes 3, 4, 13, and 14 supra.
55. Ch. 571, § 1, [1974] Md. Laws 1937, formerly ch. 181, § 9, [19721 Md. Laws
555.
1. 370 F. Supp. 1149 (D. Md. 1974), aff'd mem., No. 74-1496, 4th Cir., July 31, 1974.
2. The action was originally filed under the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1983
(1970), with a motion for certification as a class action under FED. R. Civ. P. 23. After
this action was initiated, the Supreme Court held that an application for a writ of habeas
corpus is the only remedy available to a state prisoner questioning duration of imprison-
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were four state prisoners and one former state prisoner then on
parole, all serving sentences beginning on the date sentence was
imposed, and all having been denied good conduct credit for the
period of pre-trial confinement and having had parole eligibility
computed from the date of sentence.3 The action sought to de-
clare unconstitutional the Maryland practice allowing the sen-
tencing judge to determine whether or not to grant credit for pre-
trial time against a defendant's sentence, and to further declare
unconstitutional an application of certain state statutes which
denied petitioners both credit towards parole eligibility and good
time credit for periods of pre-trial confinement.' District Judge
Harvey held that the petitioners were constitutionally entitled to
credit against sentence for pre-trial jail time and to the same
credit towards eligibility for parole, but declined to require good
time credits for pre-trial custody since state remedies had not yet
been exhausted and were not manifestly futile given the absence
of Maryland appellate decisions on point.'
In upholding the claim for credit against sentence, Judge
Harvey noted that the position of Maryland courts was adverse
ment. Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475 (1973). Since petitioners sought to decrease their
periods of imprisonment, it was agreed to treat the suit as an application for habeas
corpus, and the action was dismissed as to the four state trial judges originally named as
respondents. 370 F. Supp. at 1150. Since statewide relief would result from declarations
on the constitutionality of the statutes and practices at issue, the class action was deemed
unnecessary. Id. at 1151 n.3.
3. 370 F. Supp. at 1151. Four petitioners were confined before trial because of inabil-
ity to post bail, while the fifth, petitioner Mohr, was held without bail for murder. Id.
Noting that distinct factors were involved in Mohr's claim for relief because he was
charged with a capital offense and denied bail, the court still declined to distinguish his
case from the others in granting relief:
lIlt would offend generally accepted principles of equal protection were this Court
to grant credit for time spent in jail awaiting trial to all sentenced prisoners in the
State except those sentenced for the commission of a capital offense.
Id. at 1157 n.7. The court seems to have missed two crucial points regarding Mohr's
particular circumstances. First, credit for pre-trial time against sentence is inapposite
where a life sentence has been imposed, and therefore only credit against time served for
parole eligibility should be relevant. Second, the court argued that failure to give credit
for pre-sentence confinement was invidious discrimination against the poor in violation
of the equal protection clause. See notes 6-16 infra and accompanying text. The argument
does not hold in Mohr's case, since indigency was not the reason for his pre-sentence
confinement.
4. Id. at 1150. The statutes attacked were MD. ANN. CODE art. 41, §§ 122(a)-(b)
(Supp. 1973) on parole eligibility and MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 700(b) (Supp. 1973)
concerning good time credits.
5. 370 F. Supp. at 1154, 1155, 1157. Federal writs of habeas corpus will be heard only
if remedies in state courts have been exhausted or if the constitutional point has already
been decided against the petitioner in a state appellate court. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b) (1970);
Hayes v. Boslow, 336 F.2d 31 (4th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 1039 (1967).
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to the petitioners' contentions since although Maryland has
granted credit in cases involving a maximum statutory sentence,
it has consistently denied credit in other cases stating that no
question of constitutional dimension exists. The court, relying on
arguments developed in the district court case of Culp v. Bounds,7
and advanced by the Fourth Circuit in Ham v. North Carolina,'
adopted the petitioners' argument that Maryland's practice was
'an invidious discrimination against the poor in violation of the
equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment."'
6. 370 F. Supp. at 1152. Only Mohr received a maximum sentence, and his was an
indeterminate sentence of life imprisonment. See discussion infra at notes 27-29 and
accompanying text.
7. 325 F. Supp. 416 (W.D.N.C. 1971).
8. 471 F.2d 406 (4th Cir. 1973). Equal protection has frequently been argued to
support credit for pre-sentence jail time, the constitutional arguments arising out of three
Supreme Court decisions concerning converting fines into prison terms when indigent
prisoners are unable to pay. In Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235 (1970), the defendant
was forced to remain in jail to work off a fine and court costs not paid at the end of the
normal maximum sentence; the Court declared this a denial of the equal protection
requirement that statutory limits on imprisonment be the same for all defendants ir-
respective of economic status. Chief Justice Burger stated:
lOInce the State has defined the outer limits of incarceration necessary to satisfy
its penological interests and policies, it may not then subject a certain class of
comvicted defendants to a period of imprisonment beyond the statutory maximum
solely by reason of their indigency.
Id. at 241-42. Morris v. Schoonfield, 399 U.S. 508 (1970), a memorandum decision an-
nounced the same day, concerned the same question decided in Williams. Morris was
remanded for further consideration in light of Williams and intervening state legislation,
but Mr. Justice White felt, and expressed the view in a brief concurring opinion, that the
constitutional defect condemned in Williams applied equally "whether or not the jail term
of the indigent extends beyond the maximum term that may be imposed on a person
willing and able to pay a fine." 399 U.S. at 509. The argument that, when working off a
fine does not extend a sentence beyond the statutory maximum, an accused has no real
grievance - since the trial court could have imposed the maximum - is not impressive,
precisely because it is the court that did not do so, "and for the state to take the court's
shorter sentence and extend it because of indigency is to discriminate on the basis of
wealth." Note, Sentence Crediting for the State Criminal Defendant-A Constitutional
Requirement, 34 OHIo ST. L.J. 586, 588 (1973).
In Tate v. Short, 401 U.S. 395 (1971), the Court adopted a rationale similar to that
expressed by Mr. Justice White in Morris. Tate held that a state may not statutorily limit
punishment in a criminal case to a fine for defendants able to pay, yet automatically
convert it to a prison term for indigents unable to pay. 401 U.S. at 399.
9. 370 F. Supp. at 1152. Although the three rulings in Mohr isolate distinct types of
credit for pre-trial confinement, which have been granted or denied according to jurisdic-
tion, there is persuasive authority to the effect that constitutional entitlement, especially
under equal protection, to full credit for pre-trial custody extends equally to all areas of
credit. Most case law and secondary material have been concerned with credit against a
prisoner's sentence itself, but the same arguments and principles may be applied with
equal force to requiring full credit in determining eligibility for parole and in computing
statutory good time credits. See, e.g., White v. Gilligan, 351 F. Supp. 1012 (S.D. Ohio
1972); Schornhorst, Presentence Confinement and the Constitution: The Burial of Dead
Time, 23 HAST. L.J. 1041 (1972).
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In Culp, which involved failure to grant credit for pre-trial
confinement against a maximum sentence, it was determined
that such credit must be given in accordance with the doctrines
of equal protection and double jeopardy. 0 In applying an equal
protection argument where a sentence less than the maximum
was involved, the Ham court, citing the Culp reasoning, assumed
the petitioner's indigency at the time of arrest and bail determi-
nation and granted the petitioner credit against sentence or his
pre-trial incarceration." Judge Harvey noted the State's attempt
to limit the equal protection argument in Ham since it produced
no more than an alternative holding. 2 The initial basis for the
decision in Ham was that prospective application of the North
Carolina statute granting credit against sentence was unconstitu-
tional. :1 To validate the application of Ham to the Mohr facts, the
court relied on memorandum decisions by the Fourth Circuit
holding that Ham requires credit for pre-sentence jail time be
granted against the sentence imposed.
The essence of the equal protection argument for pre-
sentence credit is that a statutory or judicial practice, distinction,
or classification has fostered, in respect to a defined group, an
impermissible deprivation. Commonly, discrimination due to
indigency invokes equal protection concepts, as it did in Mohr,
Ham and Culp, since unless credit is granted, the indigent pris-
oner, unable to post bail, is subject to greater punishment than
is the prisoner capable of meeting bail. 5 It is essential that in
10. 325 F. Supp. at 419.
11. 471 F.2d at 408. In adopting the reasoning of Culp to support an extension of
equal protection to cases of less than maximum sentences, both Ham and Mohr passed
over language in Culp rejecting such an application:
This court assumes, without deciding, that where the time spent in custody before
commitment when added to the sentence given after trial is less than the statutory
maximum, no constitutional issue is presented. In that situation, this court. . is
reluctantly inclined to indulge the fiction that the trial judge who imposes sentence
has given the defendant credit for time served before commitment.
325 F. Supp. at 419 n.1.
12. 370 F. Supp. at 1153.
13. 471 F.2d at 408. See notes 45-48 infra and accompanying text.
14. 370 F. Supp. at 1153-54. The memorandum decisions cited were Meadows v.
Coiner, 475 F.2d 1400 (4th Cir. 1973); Steele v. North Carolina, 475 F.2d 1401 (4th Cir.
1973); Sypolt v. Coiner, Memorandum Decision No. 73-1339 (4th Cir. June 27, 1973).
Judge Harvey felt that constitutional entitlement to credit against a less-than-maximum
sentence had been "conclusively determined" by the Fourth Circuit. 370 F. Supp. at 1152.
The fabric of this determination is thin, however, since Culp spoke only of maximum
sentences, Ham adopted Culp only as an alternative holding and without informative
discussion, and memorandum decisions have questionable precedential value, as noted,
but discounted, by Judge Harvey. 370 F. Supp. at 1154.
15. See, e.g., White v. Gilligan, 351 F. Supp. 1012 (S.D. Ohio 1972); Parker v.
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addition to a constitutional deprivation there be an absence of
legitimate and articulated state purpose, as otherwise the distinc-
tion or practice is rational, and the deprivation therefore consti-
tutional. Mohr did not reach the issue of what legitimate state
purpose might be present in denying credit, although implicit in
Judge Harvey's grant of credit was the absence of such purpose."
Equal protection is not the sole possible constitutional basis
for granting credit for pre-sentence confinement." If a sentence
is imposed independently of pre-sentence time served, a prisoner
is arguably being subjected to multiple punishment in violation
of the Fifth Amendment provision concerning double jeopardy.
The leading case granting credit on double jeopardy grounds is
North Carolina v. Pearce," which held that punishment already
exacted for an offense must be fully credited if, although the
defendant's initial conviction is overturned, he is subsequently
convicted and sentenced for the same offense. As a basis for re-
quiring credit, double jeopardy may have a broader effect than
equal protection since prisoners held for non-bailable offenses
and those choosing to remain in custody pending trial are in-
cluded along with indigents unable to post bail. The clear case
for double jeopardy is where confinement in excess of a statutory
maximum occurs, although it may be applicable in other situa-
tions if one considers that the sentencing judge imposes the pro-
per sentence, and the additional punishment of serving pre-trial
Bounds, 329 F. Supp. 1400 (E.D.N.C. 1971) (maximum sentence). Workman v. Cardwell,
338 F. Supp. 893 (N.D. Ohio 1972), vacated without prejudice, 471 F.2d 909 (6th Cir.
1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 932 (1973), argued emphatically on equal protection grounds:
The Equal Protection Clause requires that all time spent in any jail prior to trial
and commitment by prisoners who were unable to make bail because of indigency
must be credited to his [sic] sentence. The Fourteenth Amendment does not
conscience discretion in such matters.
338 F. Supp. at 901.
16. The State asked whether, if equal protection required credit against an indi-
gent's sentence, the accepted practice of confining indigents unable to post bail was also
prohibited. 370 F. Supp. at 1152. It would seem that although there are legitimate state
purposes for confining those unable to post bail, they neither extend to nor are served by
the denial of credit for the pre-trial time. For the constitutional dimensions of the bail
system, see Foote, The Coming Constitutional Crises in Bail, 113 U. PA. L. REV. 959
(1965).
17. The importance of a constitutional basis for credit is in solidifying the right,
since, regardless of which basis is accepted, once constitutionally established, the right
"is as impervious to judicial limitation as it is to statutory limitation; constitutional
claims are not susceptible to defeat by exercise of a court's discretion." Stacy,
Constitutional Right to Sentence Credit for Pre-trial Incarceration, 41 U. CIN. L. REV. 823,
835 (1972).
18. 395 U.S. 711, 718-19 (1969). Pearce may not compel credit for pre-trial confine-
ment, since such confinement may not be deemed to be punishment. Double jeopardy was
an alternative basis for the decision in Culp. 325 F. Supp. at 419.
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time without credit is violative of the prohibition against double
jeopardy."
A further basis for requiring credit is due process, since deny-
ing a defendant credit for pre-sentence confinement exacts a pen-
alty for insistence on basic rights, in effect chilling the exercise
of constitutional privileges.' The argument is that if pre-sentence
credit is not given one may in effect be punished for exercising
the constitutional right to a trial by jury, and defendants held in
pre-trial custody may be disposed to plead guilty merely to effec-
tuate transfer from local jails to avoid spending time for which
they will receive no credit for their ultimate sentences.2'
Despite these constitutional arguments, even on the federal
level credit for pre-sentence confinement has been granted infre-
quently until recent years. Since the Bail Reform Act of 1966
amendment to 18 U.S.C. §3568,2 there has been a liberal
sentence crediting procedure for federal offenders. The sentencing
judge in a federal case does not take pre-trial confinement into
consideration when determining sentence, but mandatory credit
19. See generally Schornhorst, supra note 9.
20. See generally Note, The Chilling Effect in Constitutional Law, 69 COLUM. L.
REV. 808 (1969); Comment, Another Look At Unconstitutional Conditions, 117 U. PA. L.
REV. 144 (1968). See also, Hart v. Henderson, 449 F.2d 183 (5th Cir. 1971) (denial of credit
for time spent pending appeal is impermissible discouragement of basic constitutional
rights); Wright v. Maryland Penitentiary, 429 F.2d 1101 (4th Cir. 1970) (denial of credit
for pre-trial custody may be an unjustifiable conditioning of the pretrial prerogative to
challenge the first indictment). Contra, White v. Gilligan, 351 F. Supp. 1012 (S.D. Ohio
1972) (rejecting the argument that denial of credit discouraged the assertion of the right
to trial). In both Williams and Tate, supra note 8, Justice Harlan rejected equal protection
and argued a due process rationale in concurring opinions. 401 U.S. at 401; 399 U.S. at
259.
21. See Stacy, supra note 17. There is a reasonable argument that no constitutional
right to credit exists-a view Maryland retains in leaving the grant of credit to judicial
discretion while rejecting any requirement that either the sentencing judge or parole
officials credit pre-trial time against sentence or for parole eligibility. Dennis v. Warden,
12 Md. App. 512, 280 A.2d 53 (1971); Jenkins v. Warden, 4 Md. App. 629, 244 A.2d 468
(1968). For further discussion of Maryland's position see notes 27-29 infra and
accompanying text.
For federal development, see Gremillion v. Henderson, 425 F.2d 1293 (5th Cir.
1970)(no federal constitutional right to credit for pre-trial time served). In Cobb v. Bailey,
469 F.2d 1068 (5th Cir. 1972), the court reasoned that since Congress passed 18 U.S.C. §
3568 in the amended Bail Reform Act of 1966, thereby creating a statutory basis for pre-
sentence credit, such credit was not an absolute constitutional right, as "[i]f it were, then
there would have been no necessity for the legislation." 469 F.2d at 1070.
22. 18 U.S.C. § 3568 (1970):
The sentence of imprisonment of any person convicted of an offense shall commence
to run from the date on which such person is received at the penitentiary, reforma-
tory, or jail for service of such sentence. The Attorney General shall give any such
person credit toward service of his sentence for any days spent in custody in connec-
tion with the offense or acts for which sentence was imposed.
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is assigned through administrative procedures. Generally, this
statute has not been applied to state prisoners unless they were
held under federal law, and it is over state refusal to credit pre-
sentence confinement that most litigation has arisen, many juris-
dictions being slow to grant such credit. A primary reason for
judicial reluctance was a presumption, established in Stapf v.
United States,2 3 that whenever it was plausible that credit could
have been given by the sentencing judge, it was presumed that
such credit had in fact been granted. This practice has had lim-
ited applicability and is highly vulnerable to attack on constitu-
tional grounds.2" Nonetheless, it has exerted significant influence
on the courts, and has doubtlessly contributed to the scarcity of
litigation on the issue of credit for pre-sentence time. 5
Mohr requires that credit be granted against sentence even
when a sentence less than the statutory maximum is imposed.2"
Although Maryland courts have granted credit where the total of
pre-trial custody and the sentence exceeds the statutory maxi-
mum,2 7 they have refused to grant any credit against sentences
not exceeding statutory maximums, asserting that there is no
question of federal or state constitutional dimension." Thus, in
23. 367 F.2d 326 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
24. "[11f the requirement of credit for presentence confinement is of constitutional
dimension, it can hardly be satisfied by an unsubstantiated 'presumption' that a trial
judge complied with the rule." Schornhorst, supra note 9, at 1063. The Stapf presumption
was relevant only when the sentence imposed plus the pre-trial jail time was less than the
statutory maximum, otherwise the presumption was rebutted since credit could not have
been granted. In Padgett v. United States, 387 F.2d 649 (4th Cir. 1967), the Fourth Circuit
rejected the Stapf presumption, instead leaving the matter of credit to be determined on
the facts of the particular case.
25. The presumption resolved against the defendant all cases except those where the
judge had explicitly denied credit, and thus it effectively disposed of all cases involving
less-than-maximum sentences. Only when sentence plus pre-trial time exceeded statutory
maximums did a prisoner have, in effect, standing to challenge. See Comment, Credit for
Time Served Between Arrest and Sentencing, 121 U. PA. L. REV. 1148 (1973).
26. Four petitioners who remained in custody pending trial because of indigency all
received sentences which when combined with pre-trial detention (ranging from four to
eight months) did not create incarceration beyond statutory maximums. Mohr was held
without bail for twenty-two months and then sentenced to life, but the court chose not to
separate his case from the others. 370 F. Supp. at 1151, 1157 n.7.
27. The Maryland rationale for awarding credit against a statutory maximum sen-
tence is that the legislature intended, in setting such maximums, that calculation include
pre-trial confinement. Wright v. Warden, 11 Md. App. 673, 276 A.2d 411 (1971); Jones v.
State, 11 Md. App. 468, 275 A.2d 508 (1971).
28. 370 F. Supp. at 1152. One Maryland court has stated that it knows "of no
authority requiring a sentencing judge in this State to give credit for time spent in jail
pending a trial and prior to sentencing." Jenkins v. Warden, 4 Md. App. 629, 632, 244
A.2d 468, 469 (1968). Accord, Dennis v. Warden, 12 Md. App. 512, 280 A.2d 53 (1971).
Jenki s also noted the applicant's responsibility for dead time since he filed discovery
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directing that credit also be granted against less than maximum
sentences, Mohr places a new requirement on Maryland courts. 9
Current federal case law is unsettled on this issue, with con-
siderable variation between jurisdictions as to whether, and in
what circumstances, credit is required. Mohr represents Fourth
Circuit opinion, 0 but all circuit courts do not agree." Even given
the fairly definitive Fourth Circuit position, district court deci-
sions within the Fourth Circuit are inconsistent.32 Moreover, dis-
trict court decisions from other circuits show wide diversity.3 3 It
is probable that Mohr is merely another of the federal decisions
on credit for pre-sentence confinement helping to push the issue
before the Supreme Court; therefore, absent a Supreme Court
decision and, since the Fourth Circuit has previously found credit
against sentence required, the impact of Mohr's grant of credit
motions and an insanity plea, and moved for change of venue requiring transfer of trial. 4
Md. App. at 632 n.4, 244 A.2d at 469 n.4.
29. Reluctance to grant credit was epitomized in Jones v. State, 11 Md. App. 468,
485, 275 A.2d 508, 517 (1971), which limited its holding "strictly to those cases where the
maximum sentence is imposed," and thus resisted the impact of Pearce and Wright v.
Maryland Penitentiary, 429 F.2d 1101 (4th Cir. 1970) - the latter having called for broad
credit on double jeopardy and due process grounds.
30. The Ham holding requiring credit against a less than maximum sentence is
current Fourth Circuit law.
31. The Second Circuit has held on equal protection grounds that one sentenced on
a federal offense who would be serving that sentence but for inability to post bail on a
state charge subsequently dismissed is entitled to credit against the federal sentence for
time spent in state custody. United States v. Gaines, 449 F.2d 143 (2nd Cir. 1971). In the
Sixth Circuit, a petitioner charged, convicted, and sentenced to less than the maximum
in Tennessee has been denied credit against sentence for time spent in Ohio's custody
awaiting extradition following arrest on the Tennessee charge. Pernell v. Rose, 486 F.2d
301 (6th Cir. 1973). While an indigent unable to make bail received credit for pre-sentence
time against a maximum sentence in Hill v. Wainwright, 465 F.2d 414 (5th Cir. 1972),
the Fifth Circuit has declined to require credit where less than a maximum sentence is
involved. Gremillion v. Henderson, 425 F.2d 1293 (5th Cir. 1970).
32. Compare Meadows v. Coiner, 352 F. Supp. 383 (N.D.W.Va. 1973) (denying
credit against an indeterminate less than maximum sentence) with Steele v. North Caro-
lina, 348 F. Supp. 1023 (W.D.N.C. 1972) (ordering credit against an indeterminate sen-
tence with an upper limit of the statutory maximum). Credit was subsequently ordered
by the Fourth Circuit in both cases. Steele v. North Carolina, 475 F.2d 1401 (4th Cir.
1973); Meadows v. Coiner, 475 F.2d 1400 (4th Cir. 1973).
33. Narrow tests for allowing limited credit have been constructed:
If a person is charged with a bailable offense, and he is unable to post bond because
he is indigent, and he is upon conviction sentenced to the maximum imposable
sentence for the offense convicted, then his sentence must be credited for the time
spent in jail prior to trial.
Brown v. Beto, 359 F. Supp. 118, 121 (S.D.Tex. 1973). But in White v. Gilligan, 351 F.
Supp. 1012 (S.D. Ohio 1972), full credit (beyond that against sentence) was given to all
inmates unable to post bail: "[fll pretrial detention must be taken into consideration in
computing length of sentence, then it must also be taken into consideration for all other
purposes . . . " 351 F. Supp. at 1015.
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against sentence seems confined to the context of Maryland pro-
ceedings.
On the claim that petitioners had been unconstitutionally
denied credit against parole eligibility, Judge Harvey determined
that under the relevant Maryland statute,34 credit for purposes of
parole eligibility must be granted for all periods of confinement,
construing "in confinement" to include pre-sentence as well as
post-sentence time.3" To date, the Maryland courts have not said
§ 122 requires credit for pre-trial detention when determining pa-
role eligibility, and in considering §122(b) have seen "no equal
protection denial in a statute which requires persons sentenced
to life imprisonment to serve fifteen years of that sentence before
becoming eligible for parole, regardless of the amount of time
served in jail prior to trial."36 Although Judge Harvey's holding
granting credit against parole eligibility appears to necessitate a
change for Maryland courts, the position taken in Mohr is open
to debate.
The vulnerability of this portion of the Mohr holding is
shown by the recent Supreme Court decision of McGinnis v.
Royster,:7 which upheld as constitutional a New York statute
denying good time credit for periods of pre-sentence confinement
in county jails when calculating minimum parole eligibility
dates. The Court found significant differences in the purposes of
county jails, which serve primarily as detention centers, and state
prisons, where serious rehabilitative programs exist, holding that
these differences justified the unequal treatment inherent in the
statute/8 In short, the Court found no denial of equal protection
since the challenged statutory distinction furthered a legitimate
and articulated state purpose.
34. MD. ANN. CODE art. 41, §§ 122(a)-(b) (Supp. 1973). Under subsection (a) one is
eligible for parole consideration after serving "in confinement" one fourth of sentence,
while subsection (b) requires that one sentenced to life imprisonment must have served
"in confinement" fifteen years, or the equivalent with good time credits, before being
eligible for parole consideration.
35. 370 F. Supp. at 1155, There are no cases directly on point, although the Fourth
Circuit held in Wilson v. North Carolina, 438 F.2d 284 (4th Cir. 1971), that credit towards
parole eligibility for time spent pursuing appeals is required once sentence credit is given.
36. Dennis v. Warden, 12 Md. App. 512, 514, 280 A.2d 53, 55 (1971). Because of
)ennis, Judge Harvey granted federal habeas corpus relief although state remedies had
not been exhausted, since a petitioner need not pursue futile relief. See note 5 supra.
37. 410 U.S. 263 (1973).
38. Id. at 270-71.
39. The majority focused on rehabilitative purpose; since the statutory classifica-
tions promoted legitimate legislative desire for rehabilitation prior to parole, the statute
was upheld as constitutional:
lAin inmate in county jail is neither under the supervision of the State Correction
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Judge Harvey distinguished McGinnis, for he felt that the
issue faced in that case by the Supreme Court was not before him,
and McGinnis was therefore not controlling on the Mohr facts. 0
The settings for McGinnis and Mohr are as follows. New York
grants credit for pre-trial confinement against sentence and
against parole eligibility, and grants good time credit for pre-trial
confinement against sentence, but, as upheld in McGinnis, de-
nies good time credit for pre-trial confinement against parole eli-
gibility. Maryland, before Mohr, denied all of these; Mohr would
require credit for pre-trial confinement against sentence and
against parole eligibility. The issues, thus, are different, Mohr
involving credit against parole eligibility and McGinnis good time
credit against parole eligibility, but this alone does not justify
opposing decisions.4'
In the face of equal protection arguments, the Supreme
Court upheld New York's denial of good time credit for pre-trial
confinement against parole eligibility. It reasoned that legitimate
state interest in assuring rehabilitation before release justified
different treatment for indigent prisoners serving part of their
sentences in county jails before trial. For Maryland to deny credit
for pre-trial confinement in determining parole eligibility, and
yet survive a similar equal protection attack, a legitimate state
purpose in such denial would have to be shown, but none was
offered by the State in Mohr.42 It would seem, therefore, that the
Department nor participating in the State's rehabilitative programs. Where there
is no evaluation by state officials and little or no rehabilitative participation for
anyone to evaluate, there is a rational justification for declining to give good-time
credit.
Id. at 273.
In dissent, Justice Douglas accented the importance of identifying a rehabilitative
state purpose, but focused on the disciplinary power of the statute, therefore concluding
that the "discrimination in the present case is a statutory one leveled against those too
poor to raise bail and unable to retain release on personal recognizance." Id. at 280. He
continued, however: "If 'good time' were related to rehabilitative progress, I would agree
that the law passes muster under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment." Id. at 281.
40. 370 F. Supp. at 1155.
41. Factual distinctions between Mohr and McGinnis should not affect the
applicability of equal protection arguments. In Mohr, the complaint was that indigent
prisoners, held in pre-trial custody, did not receive the same credit toward parole eligibil-
ity for their total incarceration as did prisoners first confined when sentence was imposed.
In McGinnis, indigent prisoners likewise did not receive the same credit toward parole
eligibility as non-indigents, since they were denied good time credit for part of their total
incarceration. In either case, there is an allegedly unconstitutional discrimination.
42. The State did argue, in relation to credit against sentence, that requiring credit




Mohr holding requiring credit for parole eligibility is valid only
so long as no such state purpose is evident; further, Maryland
might enact legislation denying pre-trial confinement credit in
determining parole eligibility, justified by an articulated state
interest in adequate evaluation of rehabilitative progress before
parole.'3
Whereas Judge Harvey decided federal habeas corpus relief
was available for the petitioners' first and second claims, he held
that state remedies should first be exhausted as to the claim for
good time credits, since relief did not appear futile.44 Although the
claim was based on a purportedly unconstitutional application of
MD. ANN. CODE art. 27 § 700(b) (Supp. 1973), the ultimate issue
revolved around whether a more recent statute extending good
time credit to those in the petitioners' position should be applied
retroactively."
No Maryland appellate court has expressed itself on good
time credit for pre-sentence confinement, but past hesitancy in
granting credit against sentence and parole eligibility indicates
the position Maryland courts are likely to assume. It appears,
however, that constitutional considerations require retrospective
application of § 704A.46 Prospective applications of North Caro-
lina statutes granting credit against sentence for confinement
pending appeal 7 and prior to trial4" have been struck down by
43. Such legislation would withstand equal protection attack if the state's interest
in rehabilitation could be persuasively established, but might still be open to criticism
on due process grounds. It is at least plausible that statutes which deprive prisoners
remaining in pre-trial detention solely out of indigence of the same credit for pre-sentence
confinement which other prisoners may receive for post-sentence confinement are patently
unfair and indecent, and therefore denials of due process.
44. 370 F. Supp. at 1157.
45. MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 704A (Supp. 1973) provides that an "inmate sentenced
or held in a pre-trial or pre-sentence status in any county, town, or city jail" is entitled to
certain good time credits for that period of custody. If applied prospectively, petitioners
would not benefit from § 704A. Maryland courts have not yet considered the intent of the
Legislature as to the application of the statute or the constitutionality of prospective
application, but Judge Harvey recognized Maryland's willingness to adjust state practice
and law to constitutional guidelines. See, e.g., Wright v. Maryland Penitentiary, 429 F.2d
1101 (4th Cir. 1970).
46. Viewing credit for pre-sentence confinement as a constitutional right rather than
a statutory entitlement gives rise to the question of the retrospectivity of statutes. Stacy,
supra note 17, at 835. A statute granting credit only to prisoners sentenced after a given
date discriminates against indigents detained prior to trial before the effective date of the
statute by denying them credit solely on the basis of the date they were delivered into
custody. This is certainly not a legitimate state purpose, and the statute therefore consti-
tutes a denial of equal protection. See In re Kapperman, 114 Cal. Rptr. 97, 522 P.2d 657
(1974).
47. Cole v. North Carolina, 419 F.2d 127 (4th Cir. 1969).
48. Ham v. North Carolina, 471 F.2d 406 (4th Cir. 1973); Mott v. Dail, 337 F. Supp.
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federal courts. Arguably, a statute such as § 704A would likewise
be subject to constitutional infirmity if applied only prospec-
tively.
Given Mohr and Ham, the Fourth Circuit clearly requires
credit against maximum or non-maximum sentences for pre-trial
confinement on equal protection grounds. There are other consti-
tutional bases for this position, especially due process arguments,
and it may be that a constitutional right to credit involves all
elements of credit, that is, full credit. At this time, Mohr requires
that Maryland grant credit both against sentence and, under the
present statutory scheme, for parole eligibility determination,
and it seems that Maryland courts will have to apply § 704A
granting good time credits retrospectively to avoid a denial of
equal protection.
It must be considered, however, that the legislature may pass
parole eligibility statutes which are constitutionally permissible
under McGinnis, and the state may argue legitimate interest and
purpose in rehabilitation to avoid a finding that equal protection
of the laws has been denied. If the true motivating force behind
such statutes were disciplinary, then the argument of state inter-
est in rehabilitation would be something of a fraud. Even accept-
ing legitimate and demonstrable state purpose, substantial con-
siderations of due process remain.
TORTS-NEGLIGENT ENTRUSTMENT-USE OF PRIOR DRIVING RE-
CORD AS LEGALLY SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE OF HABITUAL INCOMPETENCE
AND KNOWLEDGE THEREOF-Curley v. General Valet Service, Inc.'
Alonzo Stevenson, an employee of General Valet Service
(General Valet), was hired to drive a van for his employer. The
van was entrusted to Stevenson by his employer, who gave him
specific instructions not to use the van for any purposes other
than those related to General Valet's business. However, while
731 (ED.N.C. 1972). The court in Mott, following the reasoning in Cole, found an unlaw-
ful discrimination when a statute granting credit for pre-trial custody was applied only
to cases tried after ratification of the statute. 337 F. Supp. at 732. Whereas language in
the North Carolina statute specifically required prospective application, the Maryland
statute is silent on that point, and therefore Judge Harvey felt state courts should first
determine its application.
1. 270 Md. 248, 311 A.2d 231 (1973).
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driving the van on a Sunday for personal reasons Stevenson failed
to stop at a policeman's stop signal and a red light at the intersec-
tion of Harford Road and North Avenue in Baltimore, Maryland.
The van collided with a fire truck, killed one fireman, and injured
two others. In addition, the fire truck jarred forward, struck a
privately owned automobile, and caused personal injury to the
two occupants and damage to the vehicle.2
All of the plaintiffs sued both Stevenson and General Valet,3
and following trial a jury awarded verdicts of over $600,000 in
favor of the plaintiffs.4 On appeal, General Valet contended that
the evidence was insufficient to permit the jury to consider
whether General Valet's entrustment of the van to Stevenson was
negligent. The Maryland Court of Special Appeals held that there
was not sufficient evidence to go to the jury and, further, that the
defendant could rely on the validity of Stevenson's driver's li-
cense.' The plaintiffs appealed this decision, and the Court of
Appeals reversed. Reinstating the judgment of the trial court, the
court held that there was sufficient evidence to go to the jury on
the question of negligent entrustment, and the court specifically
rejected the rationale of the Court of Special Appeals that an
employer could rely on the licensing policy of the state.'
2. Id. at 250, 311 A.2d at 232.
3. Four actions arising out of this accident were consolidated for trial in the Superior
Court of Baltimore City. They included a wrongful death action by the surviving widow
and children of the deceased fireman, James Grahe; an action by an injured fireman,
Joseph Kraus; an action by an injured fireman Thomas Curley; and an action by Mr. and
Mrs. James Newby, the occupants of the automobile struck by the fire truck. Id.
4. The jury assessed damages in favor of Mrs. Grahe as surviving widow at $200,000
and as administratrix at $1,761.90; in favor of the Grahe children at $75,000 each; in favor
of Mr. Curley at $300,000; in favor of Mr. and Mrs. Kraus at $8,500; and in favor of Mr.
and Mrs. Newby and their subrogees at $3,302.50. Id.,
5. The Court of Special Appeals may have viewed the validity of Stevenson's
driver's license as an evidentiary fact tending to support General Valet's claim that there
had been no negligence. See 16 Md. App. 453, 470, 298 A.2d 190, 198-99 (1973): "While
General Valet was not entitled to rely solely upon administrative determinations made
by the Department concerning that record, it was entitled to evaluate that record in the
light of the public policy of the State, as declared by the legislature." On the other hand,
the court may have viewed a valid license (indicating a continuing ability to comply with
the licensing requirements of the State) as virtually a complete defense. See 16 Md. App.
453, 470-71, 298 A.2d 190, 199 (1973): "We think General Valet was entitled to rely upon
the public policy of the State that a licensee who is required to drive a motor vehicle in
the course of his regular employment ... is not deemed to be unfit or unsafe to drive on
the streets and highways of the State until he has been charged with 15 points."
6. Manifestly, by our holding, we reject the notion espoused in the opinion of the
Court of Special Appeals that it is the public policy of this State that a chauffeur
with less than 15 points charged against his driving record is not an unsafe or unfit
driver, for purposes of applying the doctrine of negligent entrustment, if there is
no other evidence, known to the entrustor, which would reflect adversely upon his
driving competence.
270 Md. at 267, 311 A.2d at 241.
1974] NEGLIGENT ENTRUSTMENT
In a suit against an employer for the torts of his employee,
plaintiffs usually utilize the legal theory of respondeat superior.7
In the present case, respondeat superior was not available as a
means of recovery against General Valet because the employee
was not acting within the scope of his employment.' Thus, the
plaintiffs sought recovery against General Valet on the theory
that the entrustment of the van to the employee was negligent.
There are few Maryland cases interpreting the negligent en-
trustment theory. In one of the early cases, Rounds v. Phillips,9
the Maryland Court of Appeals adopted the rule set forth in what
is now volume two of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, section
390. In summary, this rule states that if one supplies a chattel to
another under facts and circumstances which indicate that the
supplier had actual or constructive knowledge of a propensity of
the recipient to use the chattel in a manner involving reasonable
risk to himself and others, such supplier will be liable for any
damages caused by the user. ' "
The focal points of this rule are, first, the nature and quality
of the entrustor's knowledge and, secondly, the nature of the
recipient's likely misuse of the chattel. A comment to the
Restatement (Second) of Torts indicates that the entrustor must
have knowledge of the recipient's irresponsibility with regard to
the particular chattel in question, such as knowledge that on past
occasions the recipient has acted in a reckless or dangerous man-
ner or that the person has a fixed purpose or propensity to misuse
the chattel."
7. This cause of action requires a showing that a master-servant, or principal-agent
relationship exists and that the tort occurred while the servant or agent was acting within
the scope of his employment in furtherance of the defendant's business, under his authori-
zation. Knight v. Handley Motor Co., 198 A.2d 747, 749 (D.C. App. 1964).
8. This was not even an issue in the case. 270 Md. at 253, 311 A.2d at 234. See, e.g.,
Mider v. U.S., 322 F.2d 193, 197 (6th Cir. 1963): "An employee is not engaged in his
master's business when he has taken his employer's vehicle for purely personal reasons."
9. 166 Md. 151, 170 A. 532 (1934), discussed in text at note 12 infra.
10. The section reads:
One who supplies directly or through a third person a chattel for the use of another
whom the supplier knows or has reason to know to be likely because of his youth,
inexperience, or otherwise, to use it in a manner involving unreasonable risk of
physical harm to himself and others whom the supplier should expect to share in
or be endangered by its use, is subject to liability for physical harm resulting to
them.
2 Restatement (Second) of Torts § 390 (1965).
11. 2 Restatement (Second) of Torts § 390, comment (b) (1965) (emphasis added):
... This Section deals with the supplying of a chattel to a person incompetent to
use it safely, irrespective of whether the chattel is to be used for the suppliers'
purposes or for the purposes of him to whom it is supplied .... [Tihe actor may
not assume that human beings will conduct themselves properly if the facts which
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In Rounds v. Phillips,'I the Maryland Court of Appeals held
the entrustor liable where the plaintiff's decedent was killed by
the negligent driving of the defendant's son. The evidence showed
that the parents had knowledge that the son was involved in a
prior accident; that frequent warnings were given him by the
police and others to refrain from reckless driving; that he had had
a previous traffic conviction for speeding; and that a drunken
driving conviction had resulted in revocation of his license. The
parents thus had actual knowledge of the son's negligent driving
habits, and the son's propensity to misuse the chattel was clearly
established.
In another case, Snowhite v. State, ex rel. Tennant, 3 the
employer was held liable for the entrustment of a motor vehicle
to his employee, where the employer had knowledge of his em-
ployee's alcoholism. The employee was known to consume large
amounts of alcohol on a daily basis, and he had had four traffic
convictions-in two and one-half years. The court found that this
was sufficient evidence to show that the employee was habitually
incompetent and unfit to drive. In summary, then, the Maryland
rule for liability under negligent entrustment theory emphasizes
that the supplier of a chattel has actual personal knowledge that
the recipient is likely to use it in a manner involving unreasonable
risk of harm to himself or others.
This rule must now be applied to the evidence adduced in the
present case. The evidence showed that Caplan, the president of
General Valet, a laundry service at Fort Meade, sought a driver
to drive a van to and from Baltimore. The van was used to trans-
port employees to and from the laundry and to make deliveries
during the day in the Fort Meade area. After considering several
are known or should be known to him make him realize that they are unlikely to
do so. Thus, one who supplies a chattel for the use of another who knows its exact
character and condition is not entitled to assume that the other will use it safely if
the supplier knows or has reason to know that such other is likely to use it danger-
ously, as where the other belongs to a class which is notoriously incompetent to use
the chattel safely, or lacks the training and experience necessary for such use, or
the supplier knows that the other has on other occasions so acted that the supplier
should realize that the chattel is likely to be dangerously used, or that the other,
though otherwise capable of using the chattel safely, has a propensity or fixed
purpose to misuse it.
12. 166 Md. 151, 170 A. 532 (1934).
13. 243 Md. 291, 221 A.2d 342 (1966). Cf. also Musgrove v. Hedin, 115 A.2d 516 (D.C.
Mun. App. 1955) where the defendant employer did not have knowledge of a prior revoca-
tion of a license for drunken driving. The court held that the employer only had the duty
to require the employee to show a valid operator's permit at the time of the employment,




applicants, Caplan hired Stevenson on the basis of his conclusion
that Stevenson was mature and settled and on the basis of Ste-
venson's statement that he had previously worked for a large
transfer company. Stevenson had showed Caplan his valid chauf-
feur's license; Caplan further testified that his foreman gave Ste-
venson a rudimentary driving test.'"
Stevenson had mentioned that he had completed a "state
driving school," so Caplan decided to check his driving record at
the Department of Motor Vehicles. He looked at the record as it
was displayed on a screen.' 5 The record, introduced as evidence
at the trial, showed that Stevenson held a chauffeur's license
which had never been suspended or revoked, but that there were
a number of recorded violations. Between December 1962 and
April 1967 there were six moving violations, including two failures
to obey a traffic control device, one failure to obey an automatic
signal, a failure to stop at a through highway, and reckless driv-
ing.' 6
14. Caplan testified that he had his foreman ride with Stevenson around the Army
post to ensure that he knew how to handle the truck. Stevenson testified to a much less
comprehensive test, while the foreman did not recall ever giving such a test. 270 Md. at
252, 254, 311 A.2d at 233, 234.
15. "The record was 'flashed on a screen' and Caplan looked at it. While his later
recollection of what was in the record was not entirely accurate, he was bound by the
record as he saw it at the time." Id. at 252, 311 A. 2d at 233. It is not clear for how long
the record was displayed. Presumably, Caplan could have copied it if he so desired.
16. Stevenson's driving record read as follows:
Date Disposition Description Points
62-12-07 $15.00 Automatic Signal 1*
62-12-07 10.00 Fail to change name
or address
64-07-02 2.00 No regis card in
possession
64-07-02 L 0 10.00 Fail to keep right
of center
65-04-14 5.00 Fail obey traffic 1*
device
66-04-27 15.00 Fail stop at through 1
highway
66-04-27 7.00 Improper tags
66-10-22 10.00 Reckless driving 3
66-10-01 5.00 Operating on expired 1
license
67-01-10 R W 30D Hearing-sus obey
pend clinic
67-01-09 L 0 15.00 Fail obey traffic
device
67-04-28 Completed driver clinic
Record end Total Current Points 05
*Expired points
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Caplan emphasized that he relied on the validity of a Mary-
land chauffeur's license as evidence of driving competence. 7 Also,
in the three months Stevenson was under his employ he found
Stevenson to be a competent driver. He further testified that
Stevenson was instructed not to drive the van for personal use
and that he had no knowledge of any such use."
The Court of Special Appeals stated that General Valet was
entitled to give credence to the validity of the State chauffeur's
license." Citing the public policy of the State, as declared by the
legislature in the Maryland statutory point system,2" the Court of
Special Appeals held that General Valet was entitled to evaluate
the employee's driving record in light of this public policy. Since
the State required fifteen points for suspension of a chauffeur's
license, Stevenson's five current points seemed reasonable, and
Caplan's finding him a competent driver seemed justifiable.
The Maryland Court of Appeals rejected the argument that
an employer can rely on a chauffeur's license as prima facie evi-
dence of driving ability. On the basis of Stevenson's driving re-
cord, showing four violations for disregarding signs, signals, and
traffic devices, the court found a propensity of Stevenson to disre-
gard such devices, which was known to the employer.2' Three
judges dissented, stating that the violations on the driving record
were not serious, as they could be expected in the course of nor-
mal driving employment, and were not enough to put a prospec-
Id. at 252-53, 311 A.2d at 234.
17. Id. at 253, 311 A.2d at 234. The school referred to is the Department of Motor
Vehicles remedial driving clinic which Stevenson successfully completed on April 28, 1967.
There was no showing that his license had ever been suspended or revoked.
18. It is questionable whether or not Caplan had such knowledge. Washington, the
plant foreman, testified that it was his duty to check on other drivers in the evenings to
see that the trucks were parked in front of their homes. On two occasions within three
months he found that Stevenson had used the van for personal purposes. On at least one
occasion he did not report the discovery to Caplan. Id. at 254, 311 A.2d at 234. It is not
clear whether Washington's knowledge can be imparted to his employer under agency
principles.
19. We think General Valet was entitled to rely upon the public policy of the
State that a licensee who is required to drive a motor vehicle in the course of his
regular employment (and who therefore spends much more time exposed to the
hazards of driving than a person not so employed) is not deemed to be unfit or
unsafe to drive on the streets and highways of the State until he has been charged
with fifteen points. Stevenson had five points. Such reliance would not be justified
if General Valet had or should have had knowledge of other facts, not shown in
Stevenson's record of convictions, which would reflect upon his competence to
drive. But here there was no additional knowledge.
16 Md. App. at 471, 298 A.2d at 198.
20. MD. ANN. CODE. art. 661/2, § 114 A., now art. 661/2, §§ 6-401-09 (1971).
21. 270 Md. at 266, 311 A.2d at 240.
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tive employer on notice that Stevenson was "an incompetent
driver whose use of the van ...posed an unreasonable risk of
physical harm to others."2
Other jurisdictions have affirmed the principle here rejected.
For example, in an early Pennsylvania case the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court stated:
It will first be observed that an automobile is not an instru-
mentality inherently dangerous ... where it is driven by one
regularly licensed, as here, and whose ability to operate has
been certified to by the state, which authorizes the individ-
ual to control the car. Prima facie, under such circumstan-
ces, he is fit to do so . .. .23
In the more recent case of Littles v. Avis Rent-A-Car System,24
the plaintiffs brought a negligent entrustment suit against a truck
rental agency. Plaintiffs alleged that the rental of a sizeable truck
to a driver with no special qualifications was negligent. However,
the court found no evidence of any knowledge, on the part of Avis,
of the driver's inability to drive a truck. The court did not find a
need for any greater precautions on the part of Avis prior to
leasing the vehicle. The precautions taken were a statement that
the driver had had experience in driving a truck and a production
of a driver's license duly issued by the Commonwealth of Penn-
sylvania, which Avis relied on as evidence of fitness to drive. Avis
was found not negligent in entrusting the vehicle to the driver.
The rationale of the Maryland Court of Appeals decision in
Curley appears to contravene, or at least re-evaluate, the legisla-
tive standard of competence at the wheel: The legislative stan-
dard was found to be too lenient. The court found it necessary to
go beyond the legislative standard and to decide whether one is
fit to drive on the basis of its own post facto determination of a
driving record. Does this mean that the State of Maryland allows
those unfit to drive to remain licensed? In the Curley situation,
the legislative standard for suspension of license is fifteen points.
This employee had five points, far below the suspension level.
22, Id. at 266, 311 A.2d at 241.
23. Piquet v. Wazelle, 288 Pa. 463, 465, 136 A. 787, 788 (1927). See also Lucas v.
City of Juneau, 168 F. Supp. 195 (D. Alaska 1958), where plaintiff brought an action
against a municipality for alleged negligent employment of an ambulance driver. The
court cited Piquet: "It has been recognized that a duly licensed individual is prima facie
competent to operate a motor vehicle. . . .An employer need make only a reasonable
investigation into an employee's qualifications to determine his competency." Id. at 200.
The court held that the city was not liable as they had no notice of the driver's incompet-
ence, in this case a medical condition.
24. 433 Pa. 72, 248 A.2d 837 (1969).
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In Curley, the sole evidence adduced was an employee's driv-
ing record, and this was held legally sufficient to go to the jury. 5
Prior to this case, the court required much stronger evidentiary
considerations to find that an employer had knowledge of his
driver's incompetence. While not changing the substantive rule
of law, the Curley decision definitely sets a significantly lower
quantum of evidence necessary for plaintiff to establish a prima
facie case.
Although this case does not state whether an employer has
the duty to examine an employed driver's driving record, the duty
must be inferred; given the decision here, employers of profes-
sional drivers who entrust vehicles to them must closely examine
the driving record of such employees for evidence of any habitual
incompetence. If any serious violations are discerned, the burden
of liability may be placed on the employer (for policy reasons
since he may be better able to bear the risk) in an entrustment
situation where innocent parties are subsequently injured.
25. 270 Md. at 266, 311 A.2d at 241. Addressing the issue of sufficiency of the
evidence, the court stated that negligence is ordinarily a question of fact to be determined
by the jury and that " 'Maryland has gone almost as far as any jurisdiction. . . in holding
that meager evidence of negligence is sufficient to carry the case to the jury.' " 270 Md.
at 264, 311 A.2d at 239, quoting Fowler v. Smith, 240 Md. 240, 246, 213 A.2d 549, 554
(1965). The test of legal sufficiency for submission to the jury is "whether the evidence
serves to prove a fact . . . that could enable an ordinarily intelligent mind to draw a
rational conclusion therefrom in support of the right of the plaintiff to recover." Stein v.
Overlook Joint Venture, 246 Md. 75, 81, 227 A.2d 226, 230 (1967). In a negligent entrust-
ment case, on the question of the legal sufficiency of evidence to be presented to the jury,
the United States District Court for Maryland stated:
No quantitative line can be drawn with respect to the amount of knowledge which
an owner must have of a driver's propensity for drinking to make the owner negli-
gent in entrusting a motor vehicle to him. All of the circumstances of the case must
be considered, including the type of vehicle and the area in which the vehicle is to
be operated.
State ex rel. Weaver v. O'Brien, 140 F. Supp. 306 (D. Md. 1956).
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